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Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a 
Coherent Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider 
Principle in American Trademark Law 
DAVID J. FRANKLYN* 
INTRODUCTIONt 
This Article argues that while American dilution law purports to be 
about preventing dilutive harm, it really is about preventing free-riding 
on famous marks. Because of this mismatch between dilution's stated 
purpose and hidden goal, it is a clumsy and largely incoherent doctrinal 
device. It does not allow judges to turn the anti-free-riding impulse into a 
carefully circumscribed set of principles with identifiable limits. This 
Article argues that it would be better to scrap dilution altogether and 
replace it with an independent cause of action that explicitly prevents 
free-riding in appropriate circumstances. 
On its face, dilution remains a harm-based doctrine which focuses on 
whether the unauthorized use of a famous trademark causes the famous 
mark to lose its selling power and commercial magnetism-i.e., its ability 
to distinguish goods or services in the marketplace. The flaw in this 
approach is that such harm is always speculative and exceedingly difficult 
to prove. One can never really be sure, or even fairly confident, that a 
famous mark is losing its selling power due to the use of the same or 
similar mark by another. Indeed, plaintiffs find it quite difficult to make 
this showing. 1 
* Professor of Law; Executive Director of the McCarthy Institute for Intellectual Property and 
Technology Law; Director of the Intellectual Property LLM. Program; University of San Francisco 
School of Law. J.D., 1990, University of Michigan Law School. 
t I am particularly grateful for the insightful and thoughtful comments of my friend and 
colleague at the University of San Francisco School of Law, Professor J. Thomas McCarthy, who is the 
author of the six volume treatise, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS (rev. ed. 2003). Professor McCarthy has 
written extensively about dilution law and was an invaluable resource in the preparation of this 
Article. I am also grateful for the helpful comments I received from Professors Graeme DiPwoodie, 
Mark Lemley, Joe Liu, Susan Freiwald, Josh Rosenberg, and Roger Schechter. Finally, I thank my 
research assistant, Marco Montesano, for his help in locating and translating Italian trademark cases. 
r. Proving dilution was made even more difficult by the Supreme Court's recent ruling in the 
Victoria's Secret case, where the Court held that plaintiffs must prove that dilutive harm has actUlllly 
begun to occur as a result of the challenged use; it is no longer enough to show that such harm is likely 
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And yet plaintiffs often win on their dilution claims. Why is this so? 
This Article argues that the plaintiff success rate is due largely to the fact 
that judges and juries seek to vindicate an interest that is considerably 
different than the interest which dilution law purports to protect. The 
hidden interest is a desire to punish free-riding. There is a basic 
conviction that one should not reap where one has not sown. This is both 
a moral and economic principle. It is the true driving force in many 
dilution cases-and it is distinct from the stated dilution purpose of 
protecting famous marks against dilutive harm. This can be seen from the 
fact that plaintiffs frequently win such cases when proof of dilutive harm 
is remote and highly speculative, at best, but free-riding seems obvious. 
The anti-free-riding impulse can either stay hidden in American 
trademark law or it can be openly considered and debated. It is difficult 
to defend its continued latency. Having a hidden agenda in the law is not 
a good thing. It prevents judges from identifying the actual competing 
interests at stake in the cases, and it retards the ability of judges to bring 
coherency to a particular area of law. It also enables judges to misuse the 
concept and to apply it in cases where it ought not to apply. The result 
has been that, in some instances, dilution law has offered too little 
protection to famous mark owners,2 while in other cases it has offered 
to occur in the future. See Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432-33 (2003). 
[hereinafter short cited as Victoria's Secret]. 
2. The argument that dilution offers too little protection to trademark owners is contrary to the 
bulk of scholarly writing on the subject. Most articles on dilution law-and there are many-have 
argued that it is too broad. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modem Lanham Act and the Death of 
Common Sense, roB YALE L.J. 1687, r(ig?-1713 (1999) (detailing and criticizing the overly broad 
approach taken to dilution by U.S. courts); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY 
L.J. 367, 4o8-IO (1999) (criticizing dilution doctrine as overbroad); Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of 
Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 IowA L. REv. 732, 789 (2003) (arguing that current dilution law 
wrongly allows owners of famous marks to extensively collaterally license their marks and thereby 
self-dilute while still retaining anti-dilution protection against others); Howard J. Shire, Dilution 
Versus Deception-Are State Antidilution Laws an Appropriate Alternative to the Law of 
Infringement?, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 273, 2g6 (1987) (arguing that dilution could dangerously grant the 
owner of a distinctive mark nearly limitless property interests in the mark, because, if properly 
applied, dilution prevents the use of a distinct famous mark in connection with any type of goods or 
services other than those of the famous mark owner). The United States Supreme Court has taken a 
similar approach in its recent decision in the Victoria's Secret case. See Victoria's Secret, 537 U.S. at 
432-33 (substantially narrowing the scope of federal dilution law by holding that plaintiffs must show 
actual (as opposed to merely likely) dilution to prevail under the federal act). On the other hand, some 
commentators have argued that dilution law does not go far enough in protecting brand equity. See, 
e.g., Jerre B. Swann & Theodore H. David, Jr., Dilution, An Idea Whose Time Has Gone; Brand 
Equity as Protectable Property, the New/Old Paradigm, 1 J. INTELL. PRoP. L 219, 255--56 (1994) 
(arguing for explicit rights in brand equity going beyond anti-dilution law). The opposition to a broad 
approach to dilution may be grounded, in part, in the fear that an expansive approach to language 
ownership is likely to intrude too much on expressive freedom. This is not an idle fear. But it is an 
unfocused fear. The problem is not with expansive language ownership per se; rather, it is with 
allowing people to have broad control rights in language they did not invent. Unfortunately, current 
dilution law permits exactly this wrong type of expansive ownership to occur. Here, I argue for a much 
broader (and more coherent) approach to trademark protection-but I would limit this broader 
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too much protection. At a minimum, then, there is a need to identify the 
anti-free-riding impulse in trademark law as a reality and to articulate 
how it is functioning. Toward this end, this Article explores how the anti-
free-riding impulse has been a decisive, yet unstated, factor in many 
reported dilution cases. 
A more controversial issue is whether the anti-free-riding impulse 
should be treated as legitimate and turned into an independent cause of 
action, or whether it should be rejected as a rogue and dangerous 
inclination. My position in this Article is that we ought to embrace the 
impulse as a legitimate expression of judicial desire to provide expansive 
property rights for certain kinds of words. It has been said that law 
should follow custom, not the other way around. There undoubtedly is a 
judicial custom of punishing free-riders in the trademark context. Judges 
appear eager to do this even when the free-riding is likely not harming 
the economic interests of the trademark owner-or, at least in cases 
where proof of confusion and dilution is absent. They are likely to 
continue to enforce this impulse regardless of the formal requirements of 
trademark law. My thesis here is that they frequently are enforcing this 
impulse for good reasons. A strong case can be made that free-riding on 
a famous mark is unfair and economically undesirable. The judicial 
inclination to punish free-riding deserves respect and refinement, not 
dismissive condemnation. 
Having said that, however, I am mindful of the reasons why many 
courts and commentators may be reluctant to recommend this broad 
form of trademark protection. There may be a fear that a cause of action 
which prohibits free-riding without any proof of harm would be far too 
broad. Such a cause of action could be difficult to control, and it might 
trample on other important interests of persons and companies that are 
searching for new trademarks. In short, it may be far too unwieldy an 
instrur.1ent to place into the hands of judges. 
These are understandable fears, but, ultimately, they prove 
unfounded. For one thing, this view assumes that current dilution law 
cabins the anti-free-riding impulse in a meaningful way. I attempt to 
show here that this assumption is unwarranted. More fundamentally, I 
try to show that it is possible to articulate meaningful limits on a free-
riding cause of action without resort to dilution principles like blurring 
and tarnishment.3 Requiring a finding of economic harm to the famous 
protection to a narrower class of words than currently are eligible for dilution protection. If, as I show, 
expansive protection is given only for coined and quasi-coined words, there will be little risk of any 
significant intrusion on expressive freedom For a fuller treatment of this topic, see infra Part IV. 
3· Blurring is the typical form of dilution. It means that a famous mark's commercial magnetism 
will become blurred, and therefore less capable of functioning as a strong brand identifier, if other 
companies are allowed to use the same or a similar mark to sell a variety of unrelated goods. See 4 J. 
THOMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR CoMPETITION § 24:68 (rev. ed. 2003). 
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mark is not the only way, or even the best way, to limit the anti-free-
riding impulse.4 I argue here that a more significant set of limits can be 
found by focusing on the language sharing and expressive freedom 
interests of persons who wish to use marks that are identical or similar to 
famous marks.5 These interests need to be closely examined and carefully 
articulated. One can find some effort in the decided cases to locate 
precisely these kinds of limits. But the efforts have been sporadic and 
vague. Part of my goal here is to bring this discussion out into the open. 
Nor are we completely without guidance or precedent in this effort. 
Some European countries have a cause of action, explicitly denominated 
"unfair advantage," which enables judges to punish free-riding without 
· resort to tortured reasoning about alleged dilutive harm.6 This cause of 
action, which finds no direct counterpart in American law, appears in 
most instances to be limited to situations where defendants display a 
certain kind of "bad faith," meaning they knowingly free-ride on another 
party's well-known -mark7• The European experience with the unfair 
advantage cause of action provides a useful starting place for crafting an 
independent and explicit form of protection against free-riding in 
American trademark law. 
But it is only a place to start our discussion. The Europeans have not 
done a particularly good job of articulating why free-riding is acceptable 
in some situations but not in others. The project for American trademark 
scholars is to pick up where the Europeans have left off. It should be 
possible to lay out a coherent theory of why free-riding is acceptable in 
some cases, but undesirable in others. It should also be possible to 
identify a consistent set of limiting principles which can be used in new 
cases. In the end, the result of this effort should yield a body of law that 
is at once more coherent and intellectually honest than current dilution 
law. 
The remainder of this Article is divided into seven Parts. Part I 
Tamishment is the other principal form of dilution. This refers to cases where unauthorized uses of a 
famous mark tarnish its image by associating it with an unwholesome or lower quality product. See id 
§ 24:69. For a more complete discussion of these concepts, see infra Part I. 
4· Indeed, a strong argument exists that the harm-based focus of dilution law is a proxy for 
deeper concerns which are more accurately rooted in beliefs about language sharing and expressive 
freedom These interests may be thought too indefinite, however, to serve as detenninate limits. Harm 
is thought more certain. However, as I show below, harm itself is a vague and malleable concept in 
dilution law. It offers a false sense of security as a limiting concept. It often operates as a mask for the 
true countervailing interests that need to be considered. For a more complete discussion of this topic, 
see infra Part IV. 
5· My claim here is that dilution law is at once too broad and too narrow. It offers too little (and 
too uncertain) protection to too broad a category of words. It should offer a far simpler and more 
potent form of protection to a much smaller set of words. The proposal advanced here would provide 
an expansive property right for a more limited class of words. See mfra Parts IV, VI. 
6. See infra Part VI. 
7· See infra Part VI. 
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provides an historical overview of the development of dilution law in the 
United States. Part II argues that the requirements of American dilution 
law are inherently indeterminate, exceedingly difficult to prove, and if 
applied rigorously should result in few plaintiff victories. Part III seeks to 
explain the surprising plaintiff success rate in dilution cases as a function 
of the anti-free-rider impulse. Part IV argues that the anti-free-rider 
impulse should be embraced, not eschewed, and that it can be grounded 
in a compelling "as between" type of rationale. Part V discusses how the 
proposed new cause of action might be limited based on principles of 
language sharing and expressive freedom. Part VI offers the European 
"unfair advantage" cause of action as a starting place for crafting a new 
anti-free-riding cause of action in American law and discusses how that 
cause of action should be modified to take account of the language 
sharing and expressive freedom considerations discussed above. Part VII 
revisits the history of dilution law in the United States and argues that 
the proposal advanced here captures the essence of the original dilution 
proposal as articulated in the 1920s, before dilution law took a wrong 
tum to focus on harm. Finally, this Article offers some concluding 
observations. 
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF U.S. DILUTION LAW 
Trademark law can be visualized as containing a core doctrine, often 
referred to as the likelihood of confusion analysis, and a broader more 
expansive doctrine, often referred to as dilution. The core doctrine, 
which comprised all of trademark law until the mid-I990s, allows 
trademark owners to prevent unauthorized parties from using a 
trademark that is confusingly similar to the trademark owner's mark.8 
Under this doctrine, for example, Kodak could prevent a rival camera 
company from selling Kodaka cameras. 
To prevail on such a claim, Kodak would have to show that 
consumers would be likely to believe either that Kodaka cameras were 
manufactured by the original Kodak Company or, at a minimum, that 
consumers were confused as to the affiliation or association between the 
respective producers of products bearing the Kodak and Kodaka marks. 
Trademark law does not tolerate such confusion, and it permits 
trademark owners to stop it from occurring. The rationale for providing 
8. For an overview of the likelihood of confusion doctrine, see McCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 23:1-
23:4. For a general history of trademark law, see Thomas D. Drescher, 1he Transformation and 
Evolution of Trademarks-From Signals to Symbols to Myth, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 301 (1992); Daniel 
M McOure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK 
REP. 305 (1979); and Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks-Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 551 
(1969). For a treatment of early trademark history, see FRANK I. ScHECIITER, THE HISTORICAL 
FoUNDATIONS OF THE LAw RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS (Faculty of Law of Columbia University eds., 
1925). 
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this type of protection is two-fold. First, it prevents a company like 
Kodaka from committing a form of commercial impersonation and 
defrauding consumers as to the source of goods.9 Second, it enables the 
real Kodak Company to prevent a diversion of sales to an impostor.10 
Prior to the adoption of dilution as a distinct doctrine in the United 
States, trademark owners were confined to the likelihood of confusion 
analysis. Under that analysis, only direct competitors could be liable for 
wrongfully using the established trademark of another company.11 That 
rationale for the competitor limitation was simple: absent competitive 
use, there was no injury. Kodak would not lose customers (and thereby 
revenue) in the banana or bicycle business because it did not sell goods 
in those industries.12 And without injury, there was no basis for recovery. 
This fairly restrictive approach to trademark law frustrated large 
corporations. As their product lines grew and their marks became more 
famous, they clamored for more protection. 13 They thought it absurd that 
someone should be •permitted to take a free-ride on their name without 
any legal liability whatsoever. The notion that the trademark owner 
simply had to tolerate this perceived dissipation of their intellectual 
property did not go down easily.14 
Courts responded to this pressure in various ways. Some relaxed the 
competitor restriction to allow recovery even where the parties were not, 
strictly speaking, competitors, but were in sufficiently "related" 
industries to surmise that competitive harm was not remote. 15 Others 
continued to apply the more restrictive approach. 16 A resulting tension 
existed in the commercial and legal communities. 17 In short, given the 
uncertainty of trademark law, one could never be too sure whether one 
could use a famous trademark in a wholly unrelated field with immunity. 
And, on the other side of things, owners of famous and well-established 
marks could not be too sure of the scope of their legal protection. 
The tension reached a boiling point in the mid-1920s, as the 
Industrial Revolution, with its reliance on mass-production and the need 
for a coherent and expansive national branding system, matured. In this 
context, a New York attorney named Frank Schechter wrote a law 
review article entitled The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection. 18 
9- See McCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 2:7, 2:9. 
10. /d.§ 2:7 
I I. /d. § 24:2. 
!2. Cf id. § 24:4. 
13. Cf id. § 24:5. 
14 Cf Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L REv. 813 
(1927). 
15. See McCARTHY, supra note 3, § 245· 
r6. Cf id. 
17. Cf id. 
r8. See Schechter, supra note 14, at 813. 
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Schechter argued that the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis was 
too limited and unresponsive to modem commercial realities. '9 He 
asserted that, in the (then) contemporary marketplace, trademarks 
performed far more than a mere source-identifying function.20 Their chief 
function was to form a psychological link between consumers and 
producers. 21 He spoke of the commercial magnetism of marks and argued 
that this magnetism was a form of property, developed after valuable 
investment, which deserved broader protection than the likelihood of 
confusion test afforded. 22 
Schechter limited his proposal to famous marks that were either 
coined (entirely made-up words) or arbitrary (known words that were 
arbitrarily applied to products).23 He spoke repeatedly of the property 
interest that can attach to such marks.24 The protectable property interest 
was the psychological bond between consumer and producer.25 This was a 
bond or link that often was not based on any understanding by the 
consumer of who actually made the goods.26 Thus, it was not a source-
signifying function, as such.27 But it was a function that deserved legal 
• 28 protect10n. 
Schechter offered a mixed rationale for the expanded protection he 
proposed. 29 One strand of his thinking tended toward the property 
rationale.30 He believed that famous distinct trademarks were a form of 
intellectual property that belonged to those who created the marks?' 
Schechter suggested these strong trademarks deserved protection from 
exploitation in order to honor the investment in time and money that 
went into making the mark strong.32 He believed it was wrong for others 
to exploit this value regardless of whether the trademark owner was 
harmed in any way by the unauthorized collateral use.33 Schechter wrote: 
Quite apart from the destruction of the uniqueness of a mark by its use 
on other goods ... once a mark has come to indicate to the public a 
19- See generally id. 
20. !d. at 818-19. 
21. !d. at 831. 
22 See id. at 819, 829-33. 
23. !d. at 828-30. Schechter's proposal applied only to coined, fanciful, or arbitrary marks, only to 
situations in which the junior user's mark was identical to that of the senior user, and only to use of 
identical marks on non-competing goods. See id. 
24 See generally id. at 813. 
25. !d. at 831. 
26. !d. at 832-33. 
27. !d. at 822. 
28. !d. at 822-24 
29- See id. 
30. !d. at 823. 
31. !d. 
32 I d. at 833. 
33- See generally id. at 825-31. 
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constant and uniform source of satisfaction, its owner should be 
allowed the broadest scope possible for the natural expansion of his 
trade to other lines or fields of enterprise.34 
Schechter recognized that in some situations another party's use of a 
famous trademark is not likely to cause confusion as to the source of the 
goods, and yet protection still seems warranted.35 Assume, for example, 
that a company sells Kodak bananas. Consumers are not likely to believe 
that these bananas originate from the same company that sells Kodak 
cameras. Nor are they likely to assume that the camera maker and the 
banana supplier are related or affiliated. The sale of Kodak bananas does 
not involve the diversion of sales from Kodak, because Kodak is not in 
the banana business and therefore cannot lose sales in that business. Still, 
in Schechter's view, a banana company should not be allowed to use the 
Kodak name for bananas.36 
Another strand of Schechter's thinking tended toward the tort point 
of view.37 By tort, I mean the desire to prevent injuries to a trademark 
owner (as opposed to the property-based desire to give a trademark 
owner broad control over the use of a mark without requiring proof of 
imminent harm).38 To justify his intuition that expanded trademark 
protection was warranted in certain circumstances, Schechter posited 
that mark owners could be harmed in ways beyond the traditional harm 
of losing one's customers due to the use of one's mark by a competitor.39 
The harm rationale was a supplement to his property rationale. The chief 
harm he exposed was that of a gradual lessening of the commercial 
magnetism of a mark if others were allowed to freely copy it in a variety 
of non-competing products.40 
Schechter never actually used the word "dilution." Rather, he 
described a type of harm (the gradual lessening of the mark's capacity to 
34 /d. at 823 (internal quotations omitted). 
35· See id. at 821-24. 
36. See id. at 829-30. 
37· See id. at 819-24. 
38. Tort, in this sense, is distinguished from a property rationale in trademark law. The tort 
rationale in trademark law is rooted in its original purpose-the prevention of two particular types of 
harm. First, trademark law aimed to prevent the diversion of sales from trademark owners to 
counterfeiters through confusingly similar uses of the mark by the counterfeiters. See McCARTHY, 
supra note 3, § 24:2. Second, trademark law sought to avoid a fraud-based injury to consumers who 
mistakenly purchased counterfeit goods believing them to be the real thing. The property rationale, by 
contrast, refers to the tendency of trademark law to respect an individual's claim that a word is 
exclusively hers in a broad range of situations and to enforce her attempts to transfer her ownership 
interests in that word to others. For a discussion of how trademark law has increasingly become more 
propertized in recent years, see David J. Franklyn, Owning Word~" in Cyberspace: The Accidental 
Trademark Regime, 2001 Wis. L. REv. 1251 (2001). See also Lemley, supra note 2, at 169'7-1713; 
Lunney, supra note 2, at 4o8-ro. 
39· See Schechter, supra note 14, at 824-30. 
40. See id. at 83o-33. 
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function as a strong mark) that later came to be called dilution.41 In 
Schechter's view, a famous mark's strength could be diminished in some 
way if other companies were allowed to use the same mark on different 
types of goods.42 After a while, the famous mark will not be as capable of 
cementing the bond between the original mark creator and the public.43 
The mark owner has a justifiable interest in preventing this type of harm 
from occurring before its economic interests are irreparably injured.44 
Schechter described the harm to be avoided as 
the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon 
the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing 
goods. The more distinctive or unique the mark, the deeper is its 
impress upon the public consciousness, and the greater its need for 
protection against vitiation or dissociation from the particular product 
in connection with which it has been used.45 
It took some time for American legislatures to adopt the dilution 
cause of action.46 Massachusetts was the first to do, so in 1947.47 Other 
states followed suit, adopting similar anti-dilution acts. These acts large!)' 
followed only the harm prong of Schechter's original dilution proposal.48 
That is, they specified that expanded trademark protection is available 
only in situations when the challenged use dilutes the selling power of the 
plaintiffs mark.49 They also tended to limit expanded protection to highly 
distinct, strong trademarks.50 
Theoretically, at least, two types of dilutive harm could trigger 
injunctive relief under the state anti-dilution acts.51 First, protection was 
available upon proof that the plaintiffs mark was likely to suffer a 
lessening of the capacity of the mark to perform its source-identifying 
function.52 This type of harm is sometimes called dilution by "blurring," 
because the plaintiffs mark is blurred in the mind of consumers due to 
the unrestrained use of the same mark by other, unrelated companies.53 
Alternatively, plaintiffs could claim that the challenged use tarnished 
41. See Nelson, supra note 2, at 754 & n.145. 
42. See Schechter, supra note 14, at 824-30. 
43· /d. at 82~--30. 
44- I d. at 825. 
45· /d. 
46. For a discussion of historical developments between the time Schechter made his original 
anti-dilution proposal in 1927 and the adoption of the first anti-dilution statutes by various States in 
the 1940s, see Nelson, supra note 2, at 757--6;,. 
47· See Act of May 2, 1947, 1947 Mass. Acts 307· For the current version of the statute, see MAss. 
GEN. LAws ch. noB,§ 12 (2004). 
48. See Nelson, supra note 2, at 76o-fr:,. 
49· /d. 
so. /d. 
51. /d. aq61 n.184. 
52. /d. 
53· /d. 
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their reputation.54 This might occur because the defendant was engaged 
in a shady business or made shoddy products.55 This type of harm is 
sometimes called dilution by tarnishment.56 
In the years immediately following the enactment of state anti-
dilution acts, state court judges were reluctant to enforce the acts 
literally.57 Inexplicably, they often required plaintiffs to show a likelihood 
of consumer confusion or competitive injury.58 Initial judicial reluctance 
to fully enforce state anti-dilution statutes gradually gave way to a more 
expansive approach.59 State courts increasingly treated dilution as an 
independent and potent cause of action.00 But trademark owners were 
not satisfied with the level of protection offered by state statutes.61 
Trademark owners lobbied hard for federal anti-dilution protection.62 
They asserted that such protection was necessary to bring uniformity to 
dilution law, to make federal courts an appropriate venue for dilution 
law suits, and to ensure that nationally famous marks enjoy a strong form 
of trademark protection on a nationallevel.63 
Partly in response to the extensive lobbying efforts of trademark 
owners, Congress finally adopted federal anti-dilution protection in 1995. 
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), 15 U.S.C. § II25(c)(1), 
54 Id. 
55· Jd. 
56. Id. 
57· I d. at 763-65. 
58. I d.; see also Beverly W. Pattishall, The Dilution Rationale for Trademark- Trade Identity 
Protection, Its Progress and Prospects, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 618, 621 (1976) ("[T]he [dilution] concept 
seemingly has remained so misunderstood or unpalatable to the judicial taste that it largely has been 
ignored by the courts despite the plain dictates of the statutes and the volunrinous urgings of the 
academics." (footnotes omitted)). 
59- See Nelson, supra note 2, at 765-70. 
6o. During roughly the same time period (the 1940s-1¢os), judges also expanded the likelihood 
of confusion cause of action. ld. at 758 & n.168. Originally, that cause of action was limited to direct 
competitors. Eventually, it was expanded to include sellers of related goods. More significantly, judges 
expanded the concept of confusion to include not only confusion as to source, but also confusion as to 
sponsorship or affiliation. Congress picked up on this when it revised the federal Lanham Act in 1989 
to assert liability for confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation. See McCARTIN, supra note 3, §§ 23.8; 
24=2. This is significant because it arguably rendered dilution law superfluous. Dilution was originally 
intended to fill the void created by the fact that the standard likelihood of confusion action was limited 
to competitors. The familiar example of this void was that the Kodak camera company could not 
enjoin the use of its name by a potato chip maker since the two were not in competition and 
consumers were unlikely to assume that the potato chips came from the camera maker (i.e., no source 
confusion). Dilution, it was thought, could remedy this problem by enabling the camera maker to 
enjoin the potato chip maker on the ground that if there were many different Kodaks, the name would 
be weakened as a trademark and this was a harm that the law would prevent. With the expansion of 
the- likelihood of confusion cause of action to include confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation, 
however, it became much more possible for Kodak the camera maker to enjoin Kodak the potato chip 
maker, on the theory that consumers might think the two companies were "affiliated." 
61. See Nelson, supra note 2, at 765-70. 
62. See id. at 768-69. 
63. Cf. id. at 766. 
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provides: 
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles 
of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an 
injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a 
mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become 
famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark. 64 
127 
To establish a claim of dilution under the FTDA, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate five elements: (r) the senior mark must be famous; (2) the 
senior mark must be distinctive; (3) the junior use must be a commercial 
use in commerce; (4) the junior use must begin after the senior mark 
becomes famous; and (5) the junior use must cause dilution of the 
distinctive quality of the senior mark, by lessening the capacity of the 
senior mark to identify and distinguish goods or services. 65 
The fifth element of the FTDA follows the harm rationale for 
expanded trademark protection.66 It defines dilutive harm as trademark 
use which causes a "lessening [of] the capacity of tlie senior mark to 
identify and distinguish goods or services. "67 The harm imagined is 
necessarily progressive. The progressive erosion contemplated by 
dilution theory has been nicely explained by Professor McCarthy.68 He 
invites the reader to imagine a pure §lass of crystal clear water into which 
is placed a single drop of red dye. That first drop might not produce 
much change. But eventually, after a number of drops, the water will 
tum a distinct form of red. The more drops, the more red it will get. 
Dilution as a legal theory works in much the same way. The 
economic harm envisioned by dilution has been described as a gradual 
64. 15 U.S. C.§ I125(c)(1) (2000). The FIDA largely resembles its state-law counterparts, but it is 
different in at least three potentially iniportant respects. First, on its face the FTDA permits an 
injunction against dilutive uses of "famous" marks. There is no language specifically or even impliedly 
prohibiting "tarnishing" uses. Arguably, therefore, the federal act provides a cause of action only for 
dilution by blurring and not for dilution by tarnishment. Second, the federal dilution cause of action is 
available only for "famous" marks. Most state statutes, by contrast, protect famous or highly 
distinctive marks. Third, on its face, the FIDA states that liability follows uses that "cause" dilution. 
Most of the state statutes inipose liability for conduct that causes or is "likely" to cause dilution. The 
United States Supreme Court recently ruled that this difference in terminology means that plaintiffs 
pursuing relief under the federal act must prove actual dilution; the mere likelihood that dilutive harm 
may occur in the future is not enough. See Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc, 537 U.S. 418,432-33 
(2003). 
65. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc, 191 F.3d 2o8, 215 (2d Cir. 1999); see also McCARTHY, 
supra note 3, § 24:89-
66. Recently the United States Supreme Court reinforced the harm-based focus of dilution law by 
ruling that the FIDA requires proof of actual dilution as opposed to a mere likelihood that such 
dilution will occur sometime in the future. This was a significant development in federal dilution law. 
It made it harder to prove dilution in most cases. See Victoria's Secret, 537 U.S. at 432-33. 
67. Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 215. Although the FIDA does not expressly mention blurring or 
tarnishment, judges have it to enjoin both kinds of dilution. See McCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 24:94, 
24:104. The FIDA has also been used to prevent cybersquatting. See id. § 25:77. 
68. See McCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 24:67, 24:68. 
69. /d. § 24:92.2 
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"whittling away" of the commercial magnetism or selling power of a 
famous and distinct trademark?o No one knows exactly when a 
trademark will be hurt due to multiple diluting uses of the same or a 
highly similar mark by others.71 But dilution theory is premised on the 
notion that eventually the famous mark will lose some of its selling 
power if multiple, unauthorized uses of the mark are permitted to 
proceed.72 
Until recently, the gradual erosion theory was reflected in dilution 
doctrine. An aggrieved party could obtain injunctive relief by showing 
that a challenged use, if permitted to continue, would eventually cause 
dilutive harm.73 A plaintiff (in most jurisdictions) had to show only that it 
was more likely than not that dilution would occur at some point in the 
future if defendants and others were permitted to use a trademark that 
was the same or highly similar to the plaintiff's famous trademark.74 
Plaintiffs did not have to show actual harm.75 
Recently, the United States Supreme Court rejected the likelihood 
of dilution approach. In Moseley v. Victoria's Secret, the Court ruled that 
plaintiffs must show actual dilution.76 The Court reasoned that the 
FTDA, unlike its state law counterparts, does not include language which 
explicitly makes likely dilution actionable.n The FTDA states that an 
injunction shall follow whenever the challenged use "causes" dilution.78 
The Court ruled that this language means a plaintiff in a federal dilution 
case must prove that its mark has actually begun to be diluted as a result 
of the defendant's activities.79 Victoria's Secret, then, represents a 
70. Schechter, supra note 14, at 825. 
71. See McCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24:92.2. 
72. !d. 
73· Seeid. 
74 See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224-25 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[W]e read [the 
FIDA] to permit adjudication granting or denying an injunction, whether at the instance of the senior 
user or the junior seeking declaratory relief, before the dilution has actually occurred."); accord Eli 
Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2000) (where Seventh Circuit aligned 
itself with Second Circuit's finding that a "likelihood of dilution" is sufficient to trigger dilution 
remedies under the federal act). BuJ see Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. 
Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F. 3d 449, 461 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the FTDA provides a 
remedy only for actual dilution that has already begun to occur); accord Westchester Media v. PRL 
USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 67o (sth Cir. zooo) (aligning itself with the Ringling Bros. actual 
dilution holding). 
75· See Nabisco, Inc., 191 F. 3d at 223-25. 
76. See Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418,432-33 (2003). 
77· !d. at 433· 
78. Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, 109 Stat. 985 (1995). 
79· See Victoria's Secret, 537 U.S. at 434· No one knows exactly what Victoria's Secret means. See 
McCARTIIY, supra note 3, § 24:uo. For one thing, the ruling seems inconsistent with the gradual 
erosion theory that lies at the heart of dilution law. Moreover, the Court in Victoria's Secret stated that 
proof of actual dilution does not necessarily entail proof of current economic loss. Apparently, the 
court believes it is possible for a famous trademark to be experiencing dilution even though the 
products to which it is attached are still just as profitable as they were before the dilution began to 
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sharpening of the harm focus in American dilution law.So 
II. THE INHERENT INDETERMINACY OF DILUTION LAW 
This Article began with the assertion that the primary flaw in 
dilution doctrine lies in the fact that dilution is vague and indeterminate, 
and that if it is taken seriously as a concept, it is nearly impossible to 
prove. This Part seeks to support that assertion. 
The primary type of dilution is blurring. The notion here is that 
multiple uses of the same mark on different types of products will 
eventually blur the distinctive character of the famous trademark and 
cause it to lose some of its commercial magnetism and selling power.8' 
The concept of blurring is complex. It assumes that a mark has a degree 
of distinctiveness in the public consciousness and that this degree of 
distinctiveness can be measured. It also assumes that multiple uses of the 
same trademark can blur that distinctiveness in the public consciousness. 
This blurring occurs because consumers no longer associate the famous 
mark with only one line of goods or only one source of goods.82 Dilution 
theory further assumes that once blurring occurs, the blurred mark is less 
capable of functioning as a strong source identifier for the company that 
originally adopted that mark.83 Over time, this lessening of capacity to 
identify goods and services is likely to weaken the brand and cause 
measurable financial loss to the mark owner.84 
For example, take the famous trademark Kodak, which is known 
primarily as the brand name for a type of camera equipment. If other 
companies attempt to use Kodak as their own mark for unrelated goods, 
occur. This is a strange and highly dubious assumption. If one is going to require actual dilution, it 
would seem much more logical to conclude that this necessarily entails proof of economic hann, as the 
Fourth Circuit concluded in the Ringling Bros. decision. Ringling Bros., 170 F. 3d at 455· 
So. In the wake of the Victoria's Secret decision, the International Trademark Association 
("INTA"} presented a draft bill to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and 
Intellectual Property. The proposed bill would overrule the Victoria's Secret case and change the 
statutory requirement from proof of actual dilution to proof that dilution is merely "likely." If INTA's 
proposed bill passes, federal dilution law, like most state dilution law, will require only a showing of 
likely dilution as a basis for recovery. See generally Committee Print to Amend the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Couns, the Internet, and Intellectual Propeny of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 6 (2004) (describing the draft bill and the hearing held 
Apr. 22, 2004). 
Sr. See McCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 24:67, 2468. 
82. Mattei, Inc. v. MCA Records, 2g6 F.3d (9th Cir. 2002) ("The distinctiveness of the mark is 
diminished if the mark no longer brings to mind the senior user alone."). 
83- See McCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24:68 (Under the "blurring" theory, "[c]ustomers or 
prospective customers will see the plaintiff's mark used by other persons to identify other sources on a 
plethora of different goods and services. The unique and distinctive significance of the mark to identify 
and distinguish one source may be diluted and weakened. But no confusion as to source, sponsorship, 
affiliation or connection has occurred."). 
84 Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458 ("[T]he end harm at which [the dilution cause of action] is 
aimed is a [diminishment of] the mark's selling power, not its 'distinctiveness' as such."). 
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such as bicycles or automobiles, dilution theory would hold that these 
uses should be disallowed because they ultimately will weaken the selling 
power of the original Kodak mark and thereby injure the commercial 
interests of the owner of that mark. Dilution theory further holds that 
the owner of the Kodak mark should be empowered to prevent dilution 
before it occurs. 
The problem with this line of reasoning is that it is built on a series 
of curious and ultimately dubious assumptions.85 First, it is not at all clear 
that the degree of distinctiveness of a particular trademark can be 
accurately measured. Some marks are more famous than others, but 
fame, alone, is not an indicator of mark strength. Mark strength (which is 
what is often meant when one refers to mark distinctiveness) is a slippery 
concept. Ultimately it refers to the ability of the mark to attract 
consumers' attention in a complex and information-rich marketplace.86 
But it is difficult to know why one's goods sell well or why they do not. A 
measurement of product sales may be more associated with how 
customers feel about a particular product than with a particular brand 
name, per se. 
Second, and for similar reasons, it is exceedingly difficult to measure 
any reduction in mark distinctiveness. Absent clear proof that a 
particular brand is losing substantial sales, and that such loss is caused by 
the prevalence of other similar marks in the marketplace, one could 
never really know whether dilution is occurring. But such proof is hard to 
come by. In fact, in most dilution cases, the plaintiff sues before actual 
economic harm has occurred.87 The plaintiff alleges that such harm is 
likely to occur if the defendant is permitted to continue to sell similarly 
branded goods. And so the inquiry shifts from whether dilution has 
occurred to whether it is likely to occur. 
It is even more difficult to measure whether dilution is likely to 
occur than it is to measure whether it has already occurred. This is so 
because the likelihood of dilution occurring in the future necessarily 
85. See McCARTIJY, supra note 3, § 24:100 (noting judicial skepticism about dilution by blurring); 
see also Walter J. Derenberg, The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Anti-dilution Statutes, 44 
CAL. L. REv. 439, 451 (1956) (raising doubts about dilution theory); George E. Middleton, Some 
Reflections on Dilution, 42 TRADEMARK REP. 175, 187 (1952) (stating that as of 1952: "So far as I know 
no [state law dilution case] case has turned on dilution alone"); David S. Welcowitz, Reexamining 
Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REv. 531, 583-88 (1991) ("Courts are struggling to define a dilution 
theory and to distinguish it from [traditional trademark] infringement when no real theory or 
distinction may exist .... If legislatures cannot summon the will to repeal dilution statutes, the statutes 
should be limited as much as their language will permit."). 
86. McCARTIJY, supra note 3, § n:73 ("The legal strength of a mark is usually the same as its 
economic and marketing strength"). 
87. See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc. 101 F.3d 2o8 (2d Cir. 1999) (considering before any 
extensive marketing of the defendant's product, whether Nabisco's sale of a gold-fished shaped 
cracker would dilute Pepperidge's Farm's famous cracker in the same shape). 
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entails a prediction about future events about which the court cannot 
hope to know. A judge will never know with any degree of certainty 
whether (and how many) other companies are likely to start using marks 
that are identical or similar to the plaintiff's famous mark. Nor will the 
judge be able to predict whether these future uses of the same mark are 
likely to become pervasive. And yet the probability of a number of other 
companies widely using the same or a similar mark is critical to the 
analysis. If only this one defendant uses a mark that is similar to the 
plaintiff, then dilution is much less likely to occur than if multiple parties 
use the same mark. For example, if only one candy company uses the 
Kodak mark, and if that candy company operates at a fairly low level, 
dilution is considerably less likely to occur than if fifty different 
companies use the Kodak mark on many different types of products and 
all fifty of them are well known. 
Even if many companies adopt the mark in the future, there is the 
possibility that multiple uses of the same or similar mark will not, in fact, 
materially lessen the strength or selling power of the famous mark.88 
There is scant empirical evidence that multiple uses of a famous mark 
dilute the selling power of the mark in connection with the first class of 
products to which it was attached.89 It takes a certain leap of faith to 
assume that multiple uses of a mark on diverse products will necessarily 
or even usually or probably weaken a famous mark in connection with 
either the first class of goods to which it was attached or even in 
connection with the other classes of goods to which it was attached.90 
Indeed, if dilution were a real risk, famous mark owners would rarely, if 
ever, license their marks for use in collateral markets on a variety of 
different types of goods. Yet this type of licensing occurs frequently.9' 
This means that famous mark owners that license their marks must 
assume that dilution by blurring is not likely to occur merely because 
their mark is associated with a number of different and diverse products. 
III. THE HIDDEN INTEREST IN DILUTION LAW: PREVENTING FREE-RIDING 
Given these inherent ambiguities in dilution law, it is surprising to 
see that plaintiffs have been quite successful in obtaining injunctions in 
dilution cases.92 One might have thought that plaintiffs would tend to lose 
dilution cases in all but the rare instance when their sales have 
measurably declined and they can show a clear causal connection 
between that decline and the activities of the particular company that has 
88. See Welcowitz, supra note 85, at 539· 
89· !d. 
90· !d. 
91. See David S. Franklyn, Toward a Coherent Theory of Strict Tort liability for Trademark 
Licensors, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. I, 12-13 (1<}98) (noting the prevalence of collateral market licensing). 
92. See, e.g., cases cited infra note rj5. 
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been using a mark that is identical or similar to the plaintiffs mark. At a 
minimum, one would have thought that judges would refuse to grant 
injunctions in dilution cases absent compelling evidence showing that a 
host of companies were planning to use marks similar to the plaintiff's 
mark and that, if allowed to proceed, consumers would indeed buy fewer 
of plaintiffs products than they otherwise would have bought. 
But this has not been the case. Plaintiffs frequently have won 
dilution cases with little more than the assertion that plaintiff's mark was 
famous before defendant began using the same or a highly similar mark 
without any authorization from the plaintiff.93 Judges have been willing 
to enjoin such copycat uses of famous marks even when the risk of 
dilution by blurring or tarnishment was nothing more than a mere 
possibility, and not even a compelling one at that.94 
The reason for this phenomenon is that judges are most likely 
vindicating an interest that is quite different than the interests that 
dilution law seeks to protect. The hidden interest is a desire to punish 
free-riding. There seems to be a basic conviction in the human 
consciousness that free-riding is wrong. This conviction is fairly simple 
and straightforward and probably accounts for the plaintiff success rate 
in dilution cases. 
Indeed, given the complexities and ambiguities of dilution theory, it 
is odd that trademark law came to focus on dilutive harm as the exclusive 
or even dominant mechanism for providing protection beyond the 
likelihood of confusion paradigm. This is particularly odd when one 
considers that the anti-free-riding impulse provides us with a much 
simpler and more compelling rationale for protection of famous 
trademarks. 
One can think of numerous instances where a trademark ought to be 
protected despite the absence of dilutive harm. Take, for example, the 
famous trademark Google. It is the name of a popular internet search 
engine web site. Suppose I want to sell Google candy bars without 
Google's permission. Should it be allowed?95 The traditional likelihood 
of confusion analysis probably would not provide Google with relief. It is 
doubtful anyone would conclude that Google candy bars were 
manufactured by the search engine company. Most of us are not aware of 
a search engine company being in the candy business. We would not be 
confused into buying the candy bars on the mistaken assumption that 
they came from the same company that provides excellent search engine 
services. 
93- See, e.g., cases cited infra note rj5. 
94 See, e.g., cases cited infra note rj5. 
95· For a similar case which was recently litigated, see Xtraplus Corp. v. Coogle, Inc., No. C-OI-
20425 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
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And yet my strong hunch is that most people would say Google (the 
search engine company) deserves protection in this instance. If you asked 
them to give a reason why, 99% of them (excluding trademark lawyers) 
would provide a rationale that has absolutely nothing to do with dilution. 
I have conducted an informal survey of this type. I always get the same 
basic answer. People feel strongly that Google is the property of the 
Internet search company and that a candy company called Google would 
be attempting unfairly to poach or trade off of the good reputation of the 
search engine company. People generally feel this type of "free riding" is 
wrong. They may not be able to explain why, but their intuitions rarely 
comport with anything that resembles dilution theory. 
When confronted with this hypothetical, the dilution argument does 
not naturally come to mind. It is one of those rare, exotic concepts 
invented by lawyers. It is not that a case for dilution cannot be made; it is 
just that it is not the natural and most straightforward case to make. 
Indeed, the notion that the Google mark would be diluted by the use of 
the same mark on candy bars seems far fetched. It is difficult to imagine 
the Google mark losing fame or credibility in the search engine industry 
because of the use of the same or a similar mark in other industries. The 
risk of harm from blurring seems remote at best. It is possible that the 
tarnishment type of harm could occur if the Google mark was associated 
with an unsavory business practice, but even this type of harm seems 
highly speculative. In any event, the possibility of any such harm 
occurring seems to be a much weaker and more tenuous rationale for 
providing Google with relief than the basic anti-free-riding rationale. 
The truth is that dilution law-as actually practiced and applied by 
judges-hews more closely to the anti-free-riding rationale than to the 
dilution rationale. An empirical review of the case law seems to bear out 
the notion that judges are just as likely as lay persons to conclude that 
free-riding is wrong in and of itself, and that dilution, as such, is largely 
beside the point. I next discuss four dilution cases to illustrate this 
phenomenon.l)6 
g6. I discuss four illustrative cases in this Part. There have been many, many other cases in which 
dilution has been used to punish free-riding. In all of these cases, the risk of dilutive harm has been 
remote but free-riding was obvious. See, e.g., Nikon Inc. v. Ikon Corp., 987 F.2d 91, g6 (2d Cir. 1993) 
("Ikon" dilutes "Nikon"); Polaraid Corp. v. Polaroid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830, 837 (7th Cir. 1¢3) 
("Polaraid" dilutes "Polaroid"); Hester Indus., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275, 
1281 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Wing-Flings" dilutes "Wmg-Dings"); Cynthia Grey v. Campbell Soup Co., 650 
F. Supp. n66, II75 (S.D.N.Y. 1g86) ("Dogiva" dilutes "Godiva"); McDonald's Corp. v. McBagel's, 
Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268, 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1g86) ("McBagel's" dilutes "McDonald's"); Toys R Us, Inc. v. 
Canarsie Kidie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. I r8g, 12o8 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Kids 'r' Us" dilutes "Toys R 
Us"). Indeed, courts in a number of cases have been quite clear in explicitly identifying free-riding as 
the gist of the dilution cause of action. See, e.g., Mattei, Inc. v. MCA Records, 2g6 F. 3d 8()4, 903 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (stating that dilution is about preventing free-riding on mark owners' substantial investment 
in famous marks); Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 8os (9th Cir. 2002) (standing for the same 
134 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 56:117 
A. VICTORIA'SSECRET 
One need not look far to find a compelling example of the anti-free-
rider impulse at work in dilution law. In the very recent Victoria's Secret 
case, which eventually made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, both 
lower courts were willing to enjoin the defendant's use of a mark that 
was similar to plaintiff's mark because they clearly saw the defendant as 
a free-rider.97 The Court was willing to affirm the injunction even when 
there was an absence of any type of clear evidence that dilution was 
likely to occur. 
In Victoria's Secret, plaintiff owned the famous trademark 
"Victoria's Secret" for use on women's lingerie and apparel.98 It sued a 
Lexington Kentucky retail store which called itself "Victor's Secret." 
Victor's Secret sold a variety of things, including a slight amount of sexy 
women's lingerie and a slightly larger amount of sex toys.99 Victor's 
Secret changed its name to "Victor's Little Secret," after receiving a 
cease and desist letter from Victoria's Secret's lawyers. 100 The nationally 
famous plaintiff was not impressed with this slight name change, and 
promptly brought suit in federal court for garden-variety trademark 
infringement and dilution. 101 The district court and Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals both sided with plaintiff on the dilution claim. 102 Eventually, the 
United States Supreme Court overturned the decision and remanded the 
case for further proceedings. 103 
proposition as Matte[); I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 16:3 F.3d 27, so (rst Cir. 11}98) (stating 
that dilution protects trademark owners "from an appropriation of or free riding on" the substantial 
investment that they have made in their marks). The desire to funnel all manner of anti-free-riding 
anger into the dilution mold is not limited to decided cases; to the contrary, one can see numerous 
examples of it in pending litigation. Recently, for example, Fox News Channel sued AI Franken, the 
former Saturday Night Live comedian, for placing on the bottom of the front cover of his new book 
the phrase "Fair and Balanced" -a phrase which Fox previously registered as a trademark. Fox 
candidly admits that the essence of its suit is that Franken is attempting to exploit the fame of a phrase 
that Fox allegedly made famous. This suit raises serious issues about language sharing and the proper 
boundaries of any cause of action that seeks to vindicate the anti-free-riding impulse. See infra Part V. 
97· See Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418,425 (2003). 
98. /d. at422. 
99· /d. at422-23-
roo. /d. at 423-
10!. /d. 
102. /d. at 425-26. 
103. /d. The Supreme Court reversed after finding that the FTDA requires proof of actual as 
opposed to merely likely dilution. Because the law was not clear on this point prior to the Court's 
ruling, the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Undoubtedly, the 
Court's ruling makes it harder to prove dilution and it makes the dilution cause of action less 
susceptible to use as a general anti-free-rider statute. The Court understandably wanted to limit 
dilution, probably because of its own perception that an unlimited anti-free-riding statute was a bad 
thing. As I show more fully below, the Court got it wrong. The free-riding impulse should be limited. 
But not by a strict focus on harm. If, as I contend, the impulse has deep and compelling theoretical 
justification, then it is likely that the impulse will simply find its expression elsewhere in trademark 
law. Perhaps lower court judges will further stretch the likelihood of confusion analysis to punish free-
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The lower court decisions in Victoria's Secret provide clear examples 
of the anti-free-rider impulse at work. The possibility that the use of 
Victor's Secret could dilute Victoria's Secret was remote. Victor's Little 
Secret was a small operation in a small Kentucky town. '04 The location of 
its store, nature of its business, and look and feel of its operation all 
precluded consumers from assuming that it had any connection with the 
plaintiff. There was no proof that Victoria's Secret had lost its luster as a 
trademark. 
However, Victor's Secret was free-riding on Victoria's Secret name. 
In these circumstances, it did not really matter to either the district court 
or the appellate court that the possibility of dilutive harm (i.e., blurring 
or tarnishment) was remote. There was free-riding. That was all that 
mattered. 
B. THE WAWA CASE 
Another example of how dilution rhetoric can serve as a malleable 
vehicle for the anti-free-riding impulse is found in WaWa v. Haaf'05 In 
WaWa, plaintiff owned a successful and prominent chain of convenience 
stores in Pennsylvania and surrounding areas."n Defendants, apparently 
wishing to trade on plaintiff's fame, started a single convenience store 
called HaHa. '07 Plaintiff sued defendants on several grounds, but 
ultimately proceeded only on a dilution theory. 108 Plaintiff contended that 
the selling power of the WaWa name was being undermined and diluted 
by defendants' use of HaHa as a similar name for a convenience store. '09 
They produced no proof of actual harm. 
Defendants explained that they picked the HaHa name as an 
abbreviation for their family name, Haaf. 110 The district judge would have 
none of it. In issuing an injunction, he reasoned that "[a]lthough Mr. 
Haaf denies predatory intent, I am dubious. ,m The court thought there 
was a "parody problem" in defendants' use, which, when combined with 
the fact that defendants' HaHa mark was itself distinctive and easy to 
remember, made it likely that plaintiff's famous WaWa mark would be 
"blurred" in the minds of consumers."2 
riders. Perhaps they will ignore parts of Victoria's Secret or confine it to its facts or find a way to wiggle 
around it. But they are not likely to simply abandon the desire to punish free-riders. See infra Part IV. 
104 See Victoria's Secret, 537 U.S. at 423· 
105. 40 U.S.P.Q.zd (BNA) I629, I632 (E.D. Pa. I9¢), affd without opinion, I I6 F. 3d 47I (3d Gr. 
I997). 
Io6. Id at I63o-3r. 
I07. ld at I63r. 
Io8. Id at I632-33. 
I()(). /d. at I63I-32. 
I IO. fd at I632. 
III. ld 
I I2. Id at I633. 
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The court never stopped to explain why such blurring was likely. 
Plaintiff offered a survey showing that some twenty nine percent of 
respondents thought of plaintiff's business when encountering 
defendants' store name (on the survey form). 113 But neither the parties 
nor the court explained why this mere association was likely to "blur" the 
distinctiveness of plaintiff's mark. 
The opinion can only be explained as an expression of the anti-free-
riding impulse. Indeed, the court almost acknowledges as much when it 
focuses on "predatory intent." Such intent, strictly speaking, ought to be 
irrelevant to the dilution inquiry. Dilution is about likely effects-i.e., the 
probability that numerous uses of a famous mark will diminish its selling 
power. It is not supposed to be about predatory intent. Yet courts, as 
here, often talk of such intent in dilution opinions. 114 This fact alone 
illustrates that they are as concerned about preventing free-riding as they 
are about preventing any sort of harm to a mark. The court's decision in 
Wawa honestly acknowledges the free-riding factor!' 5 
C. LEXINGTON MANAGEMENTCORPORA710NV. LEXINGTON CAPITAL PARTNERS 
The primacy of the anti-free-riding impulse is also evident in the 
court's opinion in the case of Lexington Management Corp. v. Lexington 
Capital Partners.II6 There, the plaintiff, a 401(k) fund manager, sued 
defendant, a retail securities broker, for traditional trademark 
infringement and dilution due to defendant's use of the "Lexington" 
name in the financial services industry. 117 There was no evidence of actual 
confusion and little possibility of any shared customers between the two 
companies-plaintiff dealt mainly with institutional investors as a mutual 
fund manager, whereas defendant dealt with retail investors. 118 
Plaintiff presented no evidence that its mark was famous nationally 
or in the financial services industry in particular. Nor did it explain how 
defendant's use of the word "Lexington" in its own name could dilute the 
selling power of plaintiff's mark. Indeed, such dilution was highly 
unlikely given the fact, as defendant asserted, that over 3,400 businesses 
were already using the Lexington mark nationally in one business or 
another, and that several of those uses related to financial services. 119 
On these facts, the court nevertheless ruled for the plaintiff, on both 
II3. ld. at 16:32. 
II4 See, e.g., id. at 16:33. 
115. !d. The fact that the opinion was affirmed by the Third Circuit (without opinion) arguably 
reflects the appellate court's agreement with the outcome and unwillingness to dissect the lower 
court's rationale. 
116. 10 F. Supp. 2d 271, 290 (S.D.N.Y. r()98). 
II7. /d. at 274. 
118. ld at 276. 
II(). !d. at 275-76. 
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its likelihood of confusion and dilution causes of action. 120 While the 
court stated that there was no firm evidence that defendant acted in "bad 
faith" in selecting the Lexington name, plaintiff's "strong and widespread 
presence in the investment market and press makes it unlikely that 
defendant could not have known of plaintiff's business and trademark 
rights."m The court also noted that whereas plaintiff began using the 
Lexington mark in the mid-198os, defendant did not include Lexington in 
its name until 1997. Prior to that time, defendant was called First 
Hanover Securities. 122 In these circumstances, the court apparently 
believed that defendant was attempting to capitalize inappropriately on 
plaintiff's existing reputation generally in the financial services industry. 
Based on this belief, the court was willing to enjoin defendant from using 
the Lexington mark in any manner whatsoever-despite the lack of 
evidence of dilutive harm. 123 
D. T!MESMIRRORMAGAZINEV. LASVEGASSPORTSNEWS 
In Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, 124 
plaintiff was the owner of the trademark "Sporting News," which had 
been used as the name of a sports magazine since 1886.125 Plaintiff's 
magazine provided its readers with information on baseball, basketball, 
football, and hockey, and had a weekly circulation of approximately 
540,000 customers in the United States.126 
Defendant originally published a gambling news magazine in Las 
Vegas under the name "Las Vegas Sports News," but changed its name 
in 1997 to "Las Vegas Sporting News," in an effort to boost sales.127 
Defendant's magazine contained articles, editorials, and advertisements 
on sports wagering for "the sports gaming enthusiast. "128 
Plaintiff sued defendant solely on a dilution theory. 129 The district 
court found for plaintiff and the Third Circuit affirmed. 130 The appellate 
court held that the plaintiff's mark was sufficiently famous in its "niche 
market" to qualify for protection under the FTDA. 131 The Court also 
found that defendant's use was likely to blur the distinctiveness of 
120. !d. at 290. 
121. /d. at 287 n.12. 
122 /d. at 276. 
123- /d. at 283. 
124. 212 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2000). 
125. /d. at 16o. 
126. ld at 161. 
127. /d. 
128. !d. 
129- /d. at 162. 
130. /d. at 170. 
131. !d. at 164--65. 
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plaintiff's mark in the mind of consumers.'32 
The Court's holding cannot be explained on a dilution rationale. 
There was no evidence that purchasers of plaintiff's magazine had come 
to associate plaintiff's mark with gaming; nor was there a serious risk that 
that would occur in the future. Rather, both the district and appellate 
courts seemed genuinely troubled by the fact that defendant clearly had 
attempted to take a free-ride on the superior notoriety and good 
reputation of plaintiff's publication. '33 
IV. TowARD A MoRE CoHERENT ANTI-FREE-RIDER THEORY 
In the foregoing Part, I showed that judges appear to frequently use 
dilution law as a mechanism for vindicating the anti-free-riding impulse, 
even when dilutive harm is remote. Accepting that this phenomenon 
exists, there are two possible responses. One could conclude that the 
judicial inclination to punish free-riding through the malleable vehicle of 
dilution law is wrong and should be stopped. Perhaps this is one reason 
the United States Supreme Court recently attempted to rein in federal 
dilution with the new requirement that plaintiffs prove actual dilution.'34 
On this view, the problem is not with the harm requirement, as such, but 
rather with how slippery it has been and how easy it has been to avoid. 
The remedy, if one accepts this approach, is to make harm a more central 
and meaningful component of dilution law. In this way, the judicial 
tendency to vindicate the anti-free-rider impulse in cases where dilution 
132. ld. at 169-70. 
133. The use of dilution law to punish free-riders in the absence of blurring or tamishment can also 
be seen in the early cybersquatter cases. Prior to the adoption of the federal Anti-Cybersquatting 
Protection Act ("ACPA") in 1999, plaintiffs' claims were usually funneled into the dilution mold. It 
was a poor fit. Judges did not like cybersquatting. They clearly thought it a form of free-riding that 
should be stopped. They therefore found little difficulty in stretching standard dilution law to achieve 
that end. One of the first instances of cybersquatting to be enjoined under the FTDA occurred in 
lntermatic v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1241 (N.D. Ill. 19¢). Mr. Toeppen had reserved hundreds of 
famous trademarks as Internet domain names before the trademark owners could do so. The district 
court granted summary judgment against Toeppen on the dilution count. The result in Toeppen 
cannot be squared with the theory of dilution or the wording of the FTDA. Toeppen did not dilute the 
selling power of the Panavision trademark through blurring or tarnishment. It is probable that the 
judges were convinced that Mr. Toeppen was attempting to reap where he had not sown. He was a 
classic free-rider. 
The impulse to punish free-riding in the cybersquatting context is not limited to the judicial arena. The 
ACP A itself is a legislative expression of the anti-free-riding impulse. Because some judges thought it 
intellectually dishonest to punish cybersquatting through the dilution cause of action, they refused to 
enjoin activity that clearly counted as free-riding. Congress eventually elevated the anti-free-riding 
impulse to a statutory cause of action in the ACP A. Courts increasingly interpret the ACP A to punish 
free-riding whenever the defendant has used a famous mark as part of its domain name with 
knowledge of the mark's fame. See, e.g., Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 157 F. Supp. 
2d 658, 679 (E.D. Va. 2001) (granting summary judgment against cyber-squatter largely due to the 
anti-free-rider impulse, where bad faith arguably should have been a triable issue of fact); see also 
Xtraplus Corp. v. Google, Inc., No. C-01-20425 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
134 See supra Part I. 
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is highly unlikely might be minimized. · 
Another possible approach-and the one I advance here-is to 
embrace the anti-free-rider impulse as a legitimate basis for an 
independent form of trademark protection. My thesis in this Article is 
that the anti-free-rider impulse should be embraced and turned into a 
separate form of trademark protection. This thesis is ultimately grounded 
in the notion that strict adherence to dilution theory would not naturally 
protect famous marks from free-riders. Rather, courts should continue to 
enjoin free-riding, but under an explicit, coherent theory that has little to 
do with dilution. In the paragraphs that follow, I offer a theoretical 
construct which might be used as the basis for anti-free-riding legislation 
that does not rely on traditional dilution principles like blurring and 
tarnishment. I first lay out the basic justifications for preventing free-
riding on famous marks. I then apply those justifications in the context of 
a hypothetical case. 
A. JusTIFYING THE ANn-FREE-RIDER IMPULSE 
The anti-free-rider cause of action in trademark law finds its 
strongest justification in a blended rationale that focuses on the 
respective rights and interests of the famous mark creator and the party 
who wishes to knowingly exploit that mark for clear commercial gain. 
Because the justification process is necessarily contextual, I refer to it as 
an "as between" type of argument. That is, as between the famous mark 
owner, who frequently expends some time, effort, and money to create 
and maintain the mark's fame, and a third party who did nothing to 
create that fame but nevertheless wishes to exploit it, we generally have 
no trouble siding with the famous mark owner. The intuition here is 
based on a vague and often unarticulated but still defensible sense of the 
equities of the situation. 
On the one side, we consider the interests of the mark owner. The 
mark owner gets credit for selecting a catchy word or phrase as a mark 
and for investing time, money, and energy to make the mark famous. 
Fame does not usually come to a mark overnight or by accident. It takes 
planning and considerable economic investment to make most marks 
famous. We feel that that investment generally deserves protection. We 
also believe that the famous mark creator should be allowed to capture 
the full economic rewards of her investment and to control how her 
investment is utilized. In disputes with free-riders, that usually means 
requiring the free-rider to obtain some sort of license from the mark 
owner. 
When examined more closely, these basic intuitions about the 
interests of the famous mark owner appear to be grounded in a multi-
faceted rationale. One strand of the rationale relies on the labor theory 
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of property rights. 135 Intellectual property rights (outside the trademark 
context) have long been justified in part by the labor theory of 
property.136 The notion here is that one deserves to own the fruits of 
one's labor. 137 John Locke posited that if a human being can be said to 
own her own body, it follows that she should own the fruits of her body's 
labors.138 This means that the laborer has a superior right to control the 
fruits of her labor and to capture benefits which those labors might 
generate. 139 As applied here, Lockean labor theory supports our intuition 
that famous mark owners deserve to own and control marks which they 
made famous and to capture the economic benefits that they generate. 140 
The other strand of the "as between" rationale finds support in 
economic incentive theory. 141 Lurking in the "as between" rationale is a 
set of economic assumptions about optimal mark investment. One 
assumption is that free-riding prevents a famous mark owner from 
capturing the full financial benefits of her mark. 142 This appears to be a 
valid assumption. If a company knows it can license its famous and highly 
distinct marks in all fields-even to those who wish to use the mark on 
totally unrelated types of goods-it will have a strong incentive to create 
a famous mark. 143 Economists might refer to this as internalizing the 
benefits of creating a famous name. 144 The famous mark owner is in the 
best position to decide to whom the mark should be licensed and to 
ensure that the mark is utilized in the most efficient and economically 
desirable manner. Uncontrolled free-riding thus provides a drain on the 
optimal use of prestigious marks. 
It is important to note that considerations of harm-even dilutive 
harm-are not necessarily wholly absent from how we view the potential 
property interests of the famous mark owner. It is possible that lurking in 
the background of the judicial (or lay) imagination is a feeling that 
uncontrolled use of a famous mark could eventually hurt the mark owner 
is some way. (Just as it is possible that lurking in the background of real 
property protection is some vague notion that trespass to property could 
135. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving To Own Intellectual Property, 68 On.-KENT. L. REv. 
6<>9, 610 (1993); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Gro. L.J. 287, 2¢-301 
(1988); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural ww: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 Omo ST. L.J. 
517,536-38 (1990). 
136. Yen, supra note 135, at 536-38. 
137. See Becker, supra note 135, at 615. 
138. See Hughes, supra note 135, at 2g6. 
139- ld at 299-
140. Seeid. 
141. See William M Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 
TRADEMARK REP. 267,278 (1988). 
142. I d. at 344· 
143. See Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 3o6 F. 3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) 
144- !d. at 512-13 (discussing the internalization concept with regard to famous marks and dilution 
theory). 
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harm the property owner in some way.)'45 Whether the harm could come 
in the form of "tarnishment" or "blurring" or even in some other sense is 
not particularly clear. But we are not troubled by that lack of clarity, 
because the immanency or likelihood of harm is not paramount -or even 
necessary to-the "as between" analysis. The gist of that analysis is that 
the famous mark owner created something of value, and that as between 
her and the third party user, the former should be able to control the 
famous mark. 
On the other side of the equation, we evaluate the interests of the 
person who wishes to use a mark that is identical or highly similar to a 
famous mark. Here we often find little to commend the would-be famous 
mark user/emulator. Her motive frequently is clear: she selected the 
mark in question because of its similarity to a famous mark. We likely 
will conclude that she must have known what she was doing, even in the 
absence of clear proof, because of the fame of the mark she attempted to 
copy. 146 One would have to be cloistered not to know what one was doing 
in most of these cases. 
The attempt to make a profit off of some one else's fame troubles us. 
There seems to be something unseemly about this type of profiteering. 
Our concern here is precisely the opposite of the intuition that underlies 
our sympathy with the famous mark owner. There we felt that the mark 
owner deserved to control her mark because she created it and made it 
famous. Here, on the other hand, we see someone trying to exploit fame 
they did not create. They are trying to obtain credit for a something they 
did not earn. This attempted exploitation appears to be a form of 
unearned advantage seeking that troubles us. In the words of the 
metaphor, we believe that one is attempting to reap where one has not 
sown. At bottom, the conduct is seen as a type of theft, and, as such, it is 
adjudged to be morally wrong. 
Our moral condemnation is intensified by the fact that in many 
instances we cannot identify any kind of justification for free-riding on 
famous trademarks. The free-rider usually did not need to use the 
famous mark. Nor can we see any benefit to allowing her to use it. There 
does not seem to be any collective gain from allowing such free-riding to 
occur. Unlike other areas of intellectual property law, free-riding on a 
famous trademark does not further innovation or technological 
advancement. 147 Thus, while unrestrained free-riding on famous marks 
145. See Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the 
Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. I()()(), 1045 (1990) (discussing the significance of the 
harm concept in Lockean property theory). 
146. See, e.g., WaWa v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1629, 16:32 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (acknowledging 
that despite the lack of proof, the court was dubious about the defendant's assertion that he was not 
attempting to free-ride on the name and reputation of the plaintiff). 
147. In patent law, by contrast, there may be pro-innovation and pro-creativity reasons to allow 
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imposes impediments to optimal mark investment, it also appears to 
provide no countervailing economic benefit to society. '48 
A final point to notice about the "as between" rationale is that it 
does not wholly depend on the strength of any one of the strands that 
comprise it. That is, we are still persuaded of its overall viability despite 
the fact that in an individual case one element of the rationale does not 
provide support for a mark owner.'49 For example, in some instances, it 
may be doubtful that a particular mark owner did much to make her 
mark famous (and thus Lockean labor theory alone would not support 
her property claim). In other cases, we might doubt that a particular 
famous mark owner would really wish to license her mark broadly or that 
anybody would really pay her money to use the mark in such unrelated 
industries (and thus economic incentive theory alone might not support 
her property claim). In still other instances, we might be quite doubtful 
that the accused use is likely to harm the mark owner in any clear way'50 
(and thus dilution theory alone might not support her property claim). 
The reason why such individually weak elements do not necessarily 
defeat the "as between rationale" is because it is always a comparative 
analysis. '5' The plaintiff may have a relatively weak property claim, but 
the defendant often has no justification whatsoever for her free-riding. 
We are willing to give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt on how much 
labor or money she expended to make her mark famous or on how 
important the lost licensing fee is to her because we can see no 
compelling benefit that comes from the defendant's free-riding. In the 
end, it is a question of control. We believe that the famous mark owner 
free-riding. The same is often true in copyright. But a similar case cannot be made here. No economic 
good is furthered when, for example, a bagel company calls its bagels "McBagels," or a bicycle 
company calls itself "Kodak Bicycles" or a children's store calls itself "Kids-R-Us." In each of these 
instances, free-riding on a famous mark imposes social costs without providing a counteiVailing social 
gain. 
r48. It might be argued that there would be some economic value to allowing unauthorized third 
parties to use famous marks (even famous coined marks that were made up and made famous by 
others), on the ground that such use might enable them to start companies or new product lines that 
would otherwise be difficult to start. On this theory, the added boost of the famous mark would give 
the would-be market entrant immediate recognition and visibility that could mean the difference 
between selling the new product or not selling it. And this economic value of the famous mark might 
be wasted if the mark owner does not want to exploit it in this marmer. While I suppose there is some 
merit to this possibility, it would seem that if such economic value were truly there, a rational mark 
owner would license the use of the mark for a mutually agre:.able price. In any event, someone 
(presumably the mark owner) needs to weigh the economic benefit that might be derived from such 
collateral uses against the harms that could come to the famous mark from either overexposure 
(b1urring) or tarnishing exposure. 
I49- See Edwin C Hettinger, JustifYing Intellectual Propeny, r8 PmL. & PuB. AFF. 3I, SI-52 (r98<)). 
rso. Of course, there be may harm in the circular sense of lost licensing fees. This is a circular 
conception of harm because it assumes that one has a property-based right to receive the licensing fees 
in the first place. 
rsr. See generally Hettinger, supra note I49, at 78. 
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should be the one to decide whether she is threatened by third party use 
or can capture a financial benefit that her famous mark made possible. '52 
To summarize, then, the anti-free-riding impulse appears to be 
embedded in a crude and unarticulated cost/benefit analysis. On the 
property side, it relies on vague notions about the degree of labor and 
monetary investment (initial mark selection, continued advertising, 
marketing efforts, and the like) that go into making a mark famous. It 
concludes that this investment deserves protection as a general matter-
to enable the mark owner to capture the full economic benefit of the 
fame she created and to control against potentially harmful uses by 
others. On the free-riding side, it generally assumes that the third party 
had improper motives, that the conduct was morally reprehensible, and 
that free-riding on famous marks does not provide any social or 
economic benefit. Finally, because the defendant's interests in such cases 
are often so weak, we generally are inclined to give plaintiffs 
considerable latitude in protecting their famous marks. 
B. ILLUSTRATING TilE "As BElWEEN" RATIONALE 
It may be useful to return to our Google hypothetical to explore the 
contours of the "as between" rationale in the context of a concrete 
152. The free-rider impulse finds similar grounding as a component of an "as between" type of 
argument in other areas of intellectual property law. Indeed, the basic structure of the argument is 
found in the famous United States Supreme Court case which is often cited as the basis for the 
conunon law tort of misappropriation. See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, at 242 
(1918) (holding that plaintiff had a property right in "hot news" which was protectable against 
misappropriation by a competing news service); see also McCARTHY supra note 3, § 10:48 (discussing 
same). The tort of misappropriation, in certain circumstances, prevents free-riding on intellectual 
property that is not otherwise protected by copyright, patent, or trademark secret. See id. 
The anti-free-riding impulse (and the as between rationale) also finds expression in the right 
of publicity. The reasoning might proceed as follows. As between a famous person (the celebrity) who 
arguably expended some time, effort, and money to create and maintain her fame, and a third party 
who wishes to exploit the famous person's identity (perhaps by putting her picture on coffee mugs), we 
generally have no trouble siding with the famous person. We feel she has a superior right to capture 
the economic rewards of her fame. We feel this way despite the fact that she may have done little to 
create her fame (and thus a property right is not well-founded on a labor theory alone). We also feel 
this way despite the fact that any harm to the celebrity's reputation from third party use may be 
remote (notice that we do not require the famous person to prove blurring, tarnishment, or anything 
even remotely like these concepts). We believe that the celebrity should have control of this asset-
she should be the one to decide whether she is threatened by the third party use. And we believe that 
the third party is a free-rider. She is attempting to reap the benefit of celebrity fame even though she 
had nothing to do with the creation of that fame. Absent countervailing considerations such as the 
defendant's free speech rights, we are often inclined to find for the famous plaintiff. See, e.g., Alice 
Haenunerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 422 (1999) 
(noting the implicit balance between competing property and use claims in the context of the right of 
publicity); see also 1. THOMAS McCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF P!mLICI1Y AND PRivACY §§ 2:1-2:5 (2d ed. 
2003) (discussing the basic rationales for the right of publicity). A similar as between type of argument 
has also been offered to justify protecting famous sports logos and the like against free-riding even in 
the absence of a likelihood of confusion or dilution. See Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity 
Rights: An Analysis of Merchandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L REv. 6o3 (1984). 
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factual scenario. There, we supposed that the Google name was used 
without permission by a candy company and we asked whether this 
should be allowed. Employing the "as between" analysis, we see that the 
founders of the Google search engine company have invested substantial 
time, money, and effort to make the Google brand a valuable 
commodity. 
The selection of the Google name also apparently entailed some 
degree of creativity. Google does not readily spring to mind as a suitable 
or natural name for a search engine company. Picking the name 
undoubtedly involved a prior search to make sure it was not similar to 
the name of any other search engine company. Indeed, the Google name 
appears to have been derived from the word "googol," which signifies 
the number one followed by a hundred zeros. Perhaps the implication 
was that the Google search engine has a search capacity that is at least as 
large as this huge number. This combination of creativity in selection and 
monetary investment in advertising to make the mark famous counsels in 
favor of granting the Google mark owners a strong property right. 
On the other side of the equation, we analyze the interests of the 
company that wishes to use Google as a name for candy. The fame of 
Google fosters a strong presumption that the candy company is operating 
with full knowledge of Google's fame as a search engine trademark and 
is attempting to exploit that fame. There also does not appear to be any 
justification for allowing the candy company to do so. An almost limitless 
number of names would be equally good for a candy company (if one 
puts aside the advantage they are attempting to gain by capitalizing off of 
Google's fame). And the candy company cannot claim that the Google 
name in any way uniquely suits their particular product or is necessary 
for them to effectively compete in the candy business. 
In these circumstances, we are justifiably inclined to find for Google. 
Our conviction is based first and foremost on our reasonable conclusion 
that the founders of Google have certain investment-backed expectations 
and that those expectations deserve legal protection. Our conviction is 
also based on the fact that the candy company has no apparent reason 
for free-riding on the fame that Google created. Lurking in the back of 
our minds may be a concern that failing to protect Google could subject 
Google to some type of harm. 
We may be justifiably concerned that if Google loses control over its 
mark, others might be able to use the mark in ways that could wash back 
on the search engine company to its detriment. But we do not feel 
compelled to make an actual finding that such harm has already begun to 
occur. Nor do we feel that Google should be required to prove a 
likelihood that it will suffer such harm in the immediate future. Our 
desire to provide Google with sufficient control to prevent such harm is 
grounded in a more basic sense that free-riding is wrong in this situation 
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and that Google has a right to control the use of this particular name. In 
short, we have no difficulty deferring to Google as the entity best 
situated to decide whether another party's use of its name is likely to 
harm it in the future. 
We also are inclined to allow Google to decide whether it wishes to 
license its mark for this particular use. We believe Google has a superior 
interest in capturing collateral licensing fees from the use of its name. 
Whether it actually would be willing to license its mark to this particular 
candy company is largely beside the point. Again, when we compare 
Google's right to profit from its investment in its name to the utter lack 
of justification for the candy company's use, we are justifiably inclined to 
allow Google to decide whether licensing its mark is in its best interest. 
To summarize, then, in Part I have demonstrated that there are good 
reasons to vindicate the anti-free-riding impulse in trademark law and 
that those reasons are only remotely related to considerations of 
traditional dilution concepts like blurring and tarnishment. I have argued 
that broad protection for famous marks can be grounded most 
convincingly in an "as between" type of analysis that compares the 
investment of the mark owner to the justifications, if any, for free-riding. 
When such justifications are lacking, we are right to conclude that the 
trademark owner should prevail. 
V. FINDING LIMITS 
Having sought to justify the basic impulse that causes judges to 
enjoin free-riding in the trademark context and to locate that impulse as 
a component in a multi-faceted analysis, I am not unmindful of the 
reasons why many courts and commentators may be reluctant to 
recommend this broad form of trademark protection. There may be a 
fear that a cause of action which prohibits free-riding without any proof 
of clear and definable types of harm (such as blurring and tarnishment 
purport to be) would be far too broad. 153 Such a cause of action could be 
difficult to control, and it might trample on other important interests of 
persons and companies that are searching for new trademarks. In short, 
it may be far too unwieldy an instrument to place into the hands of 
judges. 
These are legitimate fears, but they are largely unfocused. For one 
thing, this view assumes that current dilution law cabins the anti-free-
riding impulse in a meaningful way. As I have shown above, dilution law 
has not offered an effective set of mechanisms to limit the anti-free-
riding impulse. 154 The focus on harm as a limit has superficial appeal, but 
153. See Swann & David, supra note 2, at 225 (noting reasons why some might fear broad brand 
protection). 
I 54 See supra Part II. 
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this appeal dissipates once one realizes how speculative and 
indeterminate dilutive harm is. Courts have not done a particularly good 
job in applying dilution in a way that would make it a coherent and 
predictable-and thus well-bounded-concept.155 
More fundamentally, it ought to be possible to articulate meaningful 
limits on a free-riding cause of action without resort to dilution principles 
like blurring and tarnishment. 156 Requiring a finding of economic harm to 
the famous mark is not necessarily the only way, or even the best way, to 
limit the anti-free-riding impulse. '57 As I show below, a more significant 
set of limits can be found by focusing on the language sharing and 
expressive freedom interests of persons who wish to use marks that are 
identical or similar to famous marks. 158 
A. STARTING WITH A HYPOTHETICAL CASE 
As we have seen, dilution is not the most natural and compelling 
rationale for providing anti-free-riding protection to famous marks. It is 
also not the most natural mechanism for articulating effective and 
meaningful limits on the free-riding concept. One can think of instances 
where free-riding on a famous mark seems justifiable, but not because 
that free-riding is unlikely to dilute the selling power of the famous mark. 
Take, for example, the famous trademark Amazon.com. As we all know, 
that mark is used to sell a host of on-line products, the main bulk of 
which are books. Suppose someone decides to name their jungle 
expedition travel agency "Amazon Travel." Should this be allowed? 
I suspect that most people would answer this question in the 
affirmative. But, again, their assessment would have little, if anything, to 
do with the standard dilution law. Again, my point here is not that a non-
155. /d. See also supra note 85. 
156. Blurring is the typical form of dilution. It means that a famous mark's commercial magnetism 
will become blurred, and therefore less capable of functioning as a strong brand identifier, if other 
companies are allowed to use the same mark (or a similar mark) to sell a variety of unrelated goods. 
Tarnishment is the other principal form of dilution. lbis refers to cases where unauthorized uses of a 
famous mark tarnish its image by associating it with an unwholesome or lower quality product. For a 
more complete discussion of these concepts, see supra Part I. 
157. Indeed, a strong argument exists that the harm-based focus of dilution law is a proxy for 
deeper concerns-concerns which are more accurately rooted in beliefs about language sharing and 
expressive freedom. These interests may be thought too indefinite, however, to serve as determinate 
limits. Harm is thought more certain. However, as I have shown above, harm itself is a vague and 
malleable concept in dilution law. It offers a false sense of security as a limiting concept. It often 
operates as a mask for the true countervailing interests which need to be considered. For a more 
complete discussion of this topic, see supra Part III. 
158. My claim here is that dilution law is at once too broad and too narrow. It offers too little (and 
too uncertain) protection to too broad a category of words. A more appropriate doctrine protecting 
famous marks should offer a far simpler and more potent form of protection to a much smaller set of 
words. The proposal advanced here would provide an expansive property right-which is broader than 
the right to be free from dilutive uses-but it would limit that right to certain types of trademarks (i.e., 
coined or quasi-coined words). 
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dilution rationale could not be constructed. Rather, my point is that 
dilution is an unnatural and largely unnecessary analytical tool in this 
context. It is much more likely that people would think Amazon Travel 
ought to be allowed to utilize the word Amazon as part of their own 
name because the word Amazon was not invented by the owners of 
Amazon.com and because Amazon is the name of a jungle river and thus 
somehow linked to the nature of the travel agency's business. In short, 
people would intuitively conclude that Amazon.com's property interests 
are relatively weak and that the travel agency's reasons for using the 
Amazon name are strong. Indeed, they may even be inclined to stick to 
this analysis in the face of evidence that the travel agency selected 
Amazon as part of its name in part because of the popularity of 
Amazon. com. 
By contrast, in the earlier Google hypothetical, where we imagined a 
candy company calling itself Google Candy, we were strongly inclined to 
protect the famous mark owner. This intuition probably was grounded 
largely in our sense that Google is a strange and quirky name carefully 
selected by the Google search engine company and our sense that the 
candy company had no business-related reason to use Google as part of 
its name (aside from the obvious free-riding profit-seeking reason). 
The different intuitive reactions to the Amazon.com hypothetical 
(where free-riding seems acceptable) and the Google hypothetical 
(where free-riding seems unacceptable) are due to the nature of the 
famous mark involved in each case, and the reasons why the other party 
was using a mark which was identical or similar to the famous mark. I 
explore each of these factors in greater detail below. 
B. THE NATURE OF THE FAMOUS MARK 
The most significant limit on the free-riding impulse relates, not to 
the possibility of dilutive harm, but rather to the nature of the famous 
mark for which protection is sought. The more the famous mark appears 
to be an invented, coined, or made up word, the more inclined we are to 
protect it against any and all free-riding. The more it appears to be a 
common, descriptive, or already existing word, the less we are inclined to 
protect it against any and all free-riding. This inclination is based, in part, 
on our collective notions of labor and reward. We have inherited the 
general Lockean notion that the reward of property should follow some 
type of expenditure of labor. '59 We are not inclined to give people strong 
property rights when they expend little or no effort in creating something 
of value.'oo By contrast, we are inclined to give relatively greater property 
159- See JOHN Lcx;KE, Two TREATISES OF GoVERNMENT 305 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1¢7) (16go). 
16o. Seeid. 
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rights to people who expend labor to invent new things. 
Patent law and copyright law are prime examples of how both 
inclinations have been used to construct broad sets of intellectual 
property rights. '6' Trademark law is not usually thought to rest on 
Locke an labor theory. '62 But it does. '63 This is just another example of the 
labor instinct at work. It takes a degree of intellectual labor and 
creativity to invent a new word for use as a trademark and to then make 
that invented mark famous. By contrast, it takes relatively little effort to 
simply pluck an existing word from the known and obvious lexicon of 
existing words and to then make that word famous. In short, we are 
inclined to believe that the invented word somehow belongs to its creator 
in a way that does not necessarily apply to the plucked word. 
C. LANGUAGE SHARING 
The second reason why we are inclined to protect Google but not 
Amazon in these hypothetical cases is because of the language sharing 
interests of the alleged free-rider. We can see how one might have a good 
reason to call one's jungle travel agency Amazon Travel. Amazon is a 
common word that existed and had a real world meaning (it is the name 
of a South American river) before Amazon.com made it famous for on-
line book sales. A jungle travel agency can, therefore, reasonably claim 
part of its reason for naming itself Amazon Travel is to tap into this pre-
existing meaning. We are inclined to sympathize with this type of choice 
because we generally believe that all people should have an equal right 
to use common pre-existing words so long as they do not thereby harm 
others. '64 In this situation, the travel agency seems to have a natural and 
161. See Hughes, supra note 135, at 319-40. 
162. The traditional justification for trademark law is that it is designed to protect consumers 
against misbranded products and producers from the injury that such confusion may cause. See 
McCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 2:1-2:7. 
163. The basic "Abercrombie continuum" -which runs through all of trademark law-purports to 
offer a sliding scale of rights to trademark owners based on the nature of a particular mark. See 
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.zd 4 (2d Cir. 1976). Ranging from strongest to 
weakest, the continuum divides all verbal symbols into either fanciful, arbitrary, suggestion, 
descriptive or generic words. See McCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ n:I-II:25 (detailing Abercrombie 
continuum of mark distinctiveness). The continuum gives stronger rights to entirely made-up words. 
Generic and common words receive little or no protection. The common rationale for these 
distinctions is that made up words are more capable of distinguishing goods and services in commerce 
and thus deserve more protection. See id. at § I I:I. But surely this cannot be the totality of it. It seems 
equally if not more likely that common law judges developed these categorical distinctions in part 
because of the Lockean-based notion that the more labor one puts into selecting and inventing a mark, 
the greater one's property rights should be. 
164- It is necessary that companies cull through the English language to pick suitable marks for 
their businesses. The picking process inevitably involves a survey of common English words. It may 
also involve some creative brainstorming in which companies consider a variety of made-up words. 
Businesses need some flexibility in choosing a trademark. This flexibility may include picking a mark 
that may be the same as or similar to an existing trademark of another company. There are only so 
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compelling reason for sharing in the use of the Amazon name. 
By contrast, we are not inclined to embrace a similar language 
sharing rationale to justify the use of Google by a candy company. The 
word "google" appears to most people to be highly unusual and basically 
meaningless. In fact it was derived by the Google company, from the 
obscure mathematical word "googol," which designates the number one 
with a hundred zeros after it. '65 In any event, the hypothetical candy 
company clearly is not tapping into any preexisting and arguably shared 
meaning of the word googol. As such, it has no language sharing interests 
which even arguably could trump the property interests of Google, Inc. 
It should be noted that there is a relationship between the first 
limiting principle mentioned above (which focuses on the inventiveness 
of the famous mark) and the second limiting principle (which focuses on 
the language sharing interests of the alleged free-rider). The more 
invented a word is, the less likely that depriving other trademark users 
entirely of its use will result in any prejudice or harm to their language 
sharing rights. If a word is completely made-up and none of its 
constituent parts is comprised of an existing word or words, excluding 
others from using it should not, in the usual case, result in cutting off 
access to common words by other would-be trademark owners. 
For example, preventing others from using Kodak as a trademark 
for other types of products should not result in any harm to other 
trademark users because Kodak is not descriptively related to the 
function of cameras or any other type of product of which we are aware. 
Other companies can select a trademark that does not come close to 
Kodak without suffering any type of impairment to language sharing 
interests. '66 
many good or suitable words to go around. See Stephen Carter, The Trouble With Trademark, 99 YALE 
L.J. 759, 7~71 (1990) (explaining why language scarcity is more serious in trademark law than some 
have supposed). Some words are simply better than others at describing and identifying a particular 
line of products or services. See id. flexibility is ensured through trademark law in a number of ways. 
One way is to limit the basic level of trademark protection to the use of a similar mark on similar 
goods in a way that confuses consumers as to source, sponsorship, or affiliation. Another way is by 
requiring companies that pick common words as marks-such as the word "tasty"-to establish 
secondary meaning (i.e., trademark significance to consumers) before trademark rights attach. See 
McCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ II:15-II:18. The necessity/flexibility principle should also limit the 
operation of the anti-free-rider impulse in any new cause of action that is adopted. People have a 
strong interest in using common elements of their native language. This interest continues to deserve 
protection even when one wishes to use language as part of one's trademark and even when that 
language resembles language that is already being used as a mark by someone else. 
165. See Google Corporate Information, Google History, available at www.google.com/corporate/ 
history.html (describing the story of how and why Google picked its trademark). 
166. The foregoing discussion might be seen as an application of Lockean labor theory, in general, 
and of the Lockean Proviso, in particular. In his classical work entitled Two TREATIES OF GoVERNMENf, 
the sixteenth century English Philosopher John Locke posited that a person should be able to exclude 
others from the fruits of her labor, so long as she left "enough and as good" for others. See JoHN 
LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GoVERNMENf 27 (Peter l..aslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1¢4) ( 1690 ). The 
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By focusing on the degree of inventiveness of the famous mark and 
the potential language sharing interests of the free-rider we should be 
able to construct a more natural and compelling set of limits on an anti-
free-rider impulse than exist under current dilution law. With its myopic 
concentration on concepts like blurring and tarnishment, dilution law 
largely misses these issues. The result has been a body of law that is 
unnatural and incoherent, both in its underlying justification and in its 
purported limiting devices. 
D. THE lDENTICALITY IssUE 
Another possible way to limit the anti-free-rider impulse would be 
to hold that free-riding on famous marks should only be actionable when 
the defendant uses the exact same mark as the plaintiff's famous mark. 
There is some support for this notion historically. For example, in his 
seminal law review article, Frank Schechter limited his original dilution 
proposal to cases where the defendant's mark was identical to the 
famous mark for which protection was sought. '67 More recently, the 
United States Supreme Court held in the Victoria's Secret case that a 
federal dilution claim requires proof of more than a mere mental 
association between the famous and accused mark, but it limited this 
holding to cases where the accused and famous mark are not identical. '68 
It thus held open the door to the possibility that federal dilution can be 
based on nothin~ more than mere mental association when the marks are 
in fact identical.' The upshot of this holding is that it is now much easier 
to prove a dilution claim if the famous and accused marks are identical. '70 
At first blush, the identicality notion promises to serve as an 
effective limiting device on an anti-free-riding cause of action. One 
would think that courts should have little difficulty in determining 
latter )X>rtion of this assertion-stating that exclusionary rights are limited by fairness principles-has 
become known as the Lockean Proviso. The typical example of how the Proviso might apply in real 
life situations involves reaping and sowing. If A farms open land (i.e., land she does not own) to the 
JX>int where it produces roo stalks of corn, A is morally entitled to exclude others from reaping any of 
that corn in the usual case. A's entitlement is based on her labor. She earned the right to reap the crop 
by planting and tending to the seed. A's right is enforceable by law, unless A occupies so much of the 
useable land in the area such that no one else can find their own land to farm. If A hogs land in this 
manner, she no longer has a moral right to exclude others from her crop. 
The Lockean Proviso provides a useful framework for analyzing the competing interests of trademark 
owners. When a person invents a word, she adds something to the language that was not there before. 
She ought to be entitled to exclude others from using that word unless to do so would mean that 
others will not have sufficient access to the language to find or invent their own useful trademarks. In 
assessing whether A's appropriation unduly limits access, one is right to consider whether A's made-
up word is itself comprised of already existing words. If so, the )X>tential costs for language sharing are 
likely to be significant. 
r67. See Mosley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 at 429 (2003). 
r68. /d. af433· 
r69, See McCARTHY, supra note 3, § ror:2. 
170. Victoria's Secret, 537 U.S. at 433· 
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whether an accused mark is identical to the famous mark for which 
protection is sought. One would also think that limiting protection in this 
manner would properly eliminate a whole host of cases from eligibility 
for anti-free-riding protection. Indeed, limiting protection based on 
identicality preserves the language sharing and expressive freedom 
interests discussed above, because those interests are less strong when 
one wishes to use a mark that is exactly the same as a famous mark. If 
non-identical uses are exempt from liability, this might go a long way in 
protecting legitimate interests grounded in expressive freedom and 
language sharing. 
On the other hand, the identicality limitation may prove problematic 
by going too far in limiting protection. In many instances we intuitively 
believe free-riding is wrong and unjustifiable even where the accused 
mark is not identical to the famous mark. Take for example the famous 
Google mark discussed above. If an on-line lending company called itself 
go$og1e.com, we would be inclined to believe that this use should not be 
allowed because the lending company is clearly free-riding on the fame 
of the distinctive Google without any apparent justification. It does not 
need to use the Google mark for any purpose. The meaning of the 
underlying English word-googol-is not related to its lending business 
in any manner we can determine. The mere fact that it has slightly 
altered the Google mark-by inserting a dollar sign-does not seem to 
be a compelling reason for either withholding anti-free-riding protection 
(as Schechter would have done) or for imposing a materially higher 
burden of proof on Google (as the Victoria's Secret holding does).'7'' 
The intuitive feeling that free-riding is unjustifiable in the Google 
hypothetical may lead courts to cheat. They may be inclined to modify 
the identicality rule and hold that free-riding on a famous mark is 
actionable so long as the accused mark is "substantially similar" to the 
famous mark. '72 Or they may stretch the identicality requirement in other 
ways to lessen its blow. For these reasons, identicality, per se, probably 
would not be an effective limiting device. 
The lesson to be derived from the identicality discussion is that the 
finding of a lack of identicality between the famous and accused marks is 
merely another shorthand way for a court to vindicate its true reason for 
withholding protection: i.e., to allow protection might intrude too much 
on the language sharing or expressive freedom interests of the person 
who wishes to use a mark that is similar to, but not identical to, the 
famous mark. It may yet be workable to have some kind of identicality 
requirement to protect against free-riding, so long as it is applied in a 
171. /d. at 433· 
172. Given the ways that courts have stretched the dilution doctrine to vindicate their anti-free-
rider impulse, this type of judicial molding of an identicality rule does not seem far-fetched 
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sensitive and flexible fashion. As stated above, there are likely to be 
cases where persons should not be allowed to use non-identical marks 
that are highly similar to, but not identical to, famous marks. 
E. REVISITING SOME DECIDED CASES 
In this section, I revisit some already-decided dilution cases to see 
how they can be analyzed differently under the approach described here. 
1. The VIcroRIA's SECRET Case173 
There can be no doubt that the proprietor of Victor's Secret was 
attempting to free-ride off the fame of the Victoria's Secret trademark. 
Victor's Secret is very close to Victoria's Secret. It should have been very 
easy for plaintiff to prove that consumers mentally associated Victor's 
Secret with Victoria's Secret. I do not mean to imply that consumers 
assumed there was any affiliation between the two entities. The district 
court properly ruled that any such perception of affiliation was highly 
unlikely. 174 Rather, consumers undoubtedly thought of the Victoria's 
Secret trademark when encountering the Victor's Secret trademark. This 
fact must have significantly influenced both the district court and the 
Ninth Circuit to find in plaintiffs favor. 
Even so, the Supreme Court was right to overrule the lower courts' 
injunction. But the Supreme Court was right for the wrong reason. The 
Court held that the FIDA requires actual dilution/ 75 which Victoria's 
Secret did not adequately prove.176 However, the proper rationale for 
deciding the case is that Victoria's Secret is not the kind of trademark 
that should be eligible for expanded (anti-free-riding) trademark 
protection at all. This is so because it is not a coined or quasi-coined 
word or phrase. Victoria's Secret is not even an arbitrary use of common 
words. Victoria's Secret probably was chosen by the women's lingerie 
company to conjure up a connection with Queen Victoria, who ruled 
during the "Victorian Age." It is a widely held belief that sexual mores 
were repressive during that age. 177 By referring to "Victoria's Secret," the 
lingerie company may have intended to convey the impression that while 
Queen Victoria was outwardly prim and proper, behind the scenes she 
lived a voluptuous sexual life. The sales pitch is clear: you may be a prim 
and proper American housewife, but you too can dress sexy in secret. 
173. See earlier discussion of the facts of Victoria's Secret, supra Part III.A 
174 See Victoria's Secret, 537 U.S. at 425. 
175. The Congressional intent to require actual dilution in the FTDA is unclear. In fact, the 
legislative history appears to be silent this point. See generally HR. REP. No. 104-374 (1995). 
q6. Id at 433· 
177. See MicHEL FoucAULT, THE HlsroRY OF SEXUALilY: AN INTRODUCITON 3-13 (Robert Hurley 
trans., Pantheon Books 1978) (1976). See also Robert Kahn, We Are Living In America's Victorian 
Age, N. CoUNlY TIMES, May 26, 2002, available at http://www.nctirnes.com/articles/2oo21o5f26/ 
export1o6o5.txt. ("Victorianism today is generally interpreted to mean little more than an atmosphere 
of sexual repression and hypocrisy ... "). 
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It would not be proper as a matter of basic language sharing and 
fairness to allow one company to have a monopoly on common language 
that might be used to conjure up this sort of imagery. The defendant in 
this case was, in essence, staking his claim to access to this common 
language. His pitch was to men- to the "Victor's" of this world, who 
might want to appear prim and proper in public, but who equally desired 
a somewhat raunchy private sex life. Victoria's Secret assumed the risk of 
such free-riding when it chose this sort of uncoined, common language as 
a trademark. From a trademark point of view, it would have been better 
off selecting a more unique word or phrase to invest in. 
2. TheWAWA Case 
The WaWa case is also worth revisiting. The reader may recall that 
in the WaWa case, the plaintiff owned and operated a number of 
convenience stores in the Philadelphia area under the trademark 
"WaWa." 178 Defendant started its own small store in the same general 
geographic vicinity under the name "HaHa. "179 Defendant stated that the 
name "HaHa" was related in some sense to his family name "Haaf."1So 
The district court was not persuaded of the relationship.'81 The case 
proceeded solely on a dilution theory. 182 The district court found for the 
plaintiff and the Third Circuit affirmed. 183 
At first blush, the holding seems sound from an anti-free-riding 
perspective. Defendant clearly was free-riding off the fame of the 
plaintiffs WaWa trademark. WaWa seems coined and meaningless. It 
may sound a bit like a baby's word for water, but that is a stretch. Thus, it 
ought to be entitled to fairly strong anti-free-riding protection. The 
problem, however, is that defendant's mark does not duplicate or 
incorporate plaintiffs mark. Rather, it is a significantly different 
variation of it. It still conjures up plaintiff's mark, but it does so in a 
slightly humorous manner. Ha ha means something in the English 
language. Ha ha is a sound we make when we wish to verbally signify 
laughter. Defendant wishes to use the phrase ha ha, not in a way that 
describes the function of its goods, but in a way that plays off the double 
meaning of the phrase in this context. It is at once a joke (ha ha) and an 
allusion to the plaintiffs trade name. 
This case is a close call, but on balance defendant's interests in 
expressive freedom and language sharing seem to outweigh plaintiffs 
interest in prevent free-riding on its mark. Plaintiff bears an extremely 
178. For factual background on the WaWa case, see supra Part III.B. 
179. Wa Wa Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629, 1631 (E. D. Pa. 19¢). 
18o. /d. at 1632. 
181. /d. at 1632-33. 
182. /d. at 163o-31. 
183. Id. at 1633; WaWa Inc. v. Haaf, II6 F.3d 471 (3d Cir. H~7) (affirming the decision of the 
district court). 
154 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. s6:II7 
low risk of harm precisely because defendant's mark significantly varies 
from plaintiff's mark. The district court undoubtedly sensed parasitic 
intent and thought this enough to justify an injunction.'84 It buttressed its 
intuition with unpersuasive assertions about the likelihood of dilution. 
Had it thought more carefully about the defendant's interests in using a 
common word-ha ha-to describe it products, the court might have 
sensed that there was ·a need to control the anti-free-riding impulse in 
this case. 
To put matters differently, one might say that plaintiff has strong 
ownership interests in WaWa, but not in HaHa. They are two different 
words. HaHa free-rides on Wa Wa, but it does more. It is a common 
English phrase. Wa wa is made-up. But it is close to common English 
words or phrases that are not made-up-phrases like ha ha, rna rna, pa 
pa, or ta ta. In choosing a word like WaWa as its trademark, plaintiff 
assumed the risk that other parties might wish to appropriate any of 
these similar words for their own convenience stores or other types of 
businesses. The key question judges should ask in these sorts of cases is 
this: by choosing an insufficiently unique mark, did plaintiff assume the 
risk that others could come close merely by using common English 
words? When the answer to that question is "yes," then anti-free-riding 
protection should be denied. This is particularly true where, as here, 
defendant's mark varies considerably from plaintiff's mark.'85 
3· The PoLARorn/PoLARAID Case 
A case we have not yet discussed, but which bears discussion in this 
context, is Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc. '86 There, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, applying the Illinois anti-dilution 
statute, found that the defendant's use of "Polaraid" for the installation 
of refrigeration and heating systems diluted the plaintiff's mark 
"Polaroid" for cameras.'87 The likelihood of harm here was remote. 
People would not be less likely to buy Polaroid cameras because they 
had seen advertisements for Polaraid cooling systems. The court 
nevertheless issued an injunction here because defendant clearly was 
free-riding on plaintiff's mark.'88 
184 See supra Part III.B, discussing district court decision. 
185. The United States Supreme Court was correct to note the importance of this factor in 
Victoria's Secret. But it related it to the probability of dilution occurring. See Mosley v. V. Secret 
Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 427 (2003). There probably is some such relationship, but it does not properly 
pinpoint the rationale for looking at the variance between the accused and the famous marks. The real 
reason why the variance matters is because the defendant's language sharing and expressive freedom 
interests are likely to be particularly strong in cases where the defendant's mark and plaintiff's mark 
are not identical. 
186. 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1¢:3). 
187. /d. at 833-36. 
188. I d. at 836. 
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Under the proposal I advance here, the court would focus first on 
the strength of the plaintiff's property interests in the Polaroid mark. The 
word "Polaroid" appears to be a fairly strong trademark. It is a coined 
word. However, even though it is an invented word, it is comprised of an 
existing word with independent meaning in the English language. Polar, 
as used in this context, probably alludes to the internal refraction of light 
in a camera. A camera refracts light between two poles. '89 Light goes 
through a tiny hole at one pole of a camera and then branches out before 
landing on the other pole. The addition of the "oid" component carries 
less apparent meaning. Oid might be a reference to a type of advanced or 
futuristic technology'90 Oid has been added to other made-up words and 
it does not appear to be particularly unique. Thus, while Polaroid is an 
invented word, it is not completely meaningless. It utilizes at least one 
known word (polar) which carries significant meaning in the English 
language and it relates that word to the function of the product at hand-
cameras. 
On the other side of the equation are defendant's interests in using 
Polaraid as a trademark. Polaraid is a complex word as used in the 
context of this case. It seems highly important that defendant sells 
heating and air conditioning equipment. Consumers are likely to 
perceive the word "polar" as used here to be a reference to the North 
Pole of the Earth. The North Pole is known to be cold.'9' Consumers are 
likely to perceive the word "aid" as a modifier of the word polar. Aid 
here might mean "reducer" or "increaser," depending on whether one is 
seeking to purchase heating or cooling equipment. If one is seeking to 
buy heating equipment, polar aid might mean relief from the cold. The 
defendant's heating equipment reduces the polar air by supplying hot air. 
Conversely, if one is seeking to buy air conditioning equipment, polar aid 
might mean the addition of cold air into one's house. Either way, 
Polaraid is a clever combination of two known English words. 
In these circumstances, defendant has a strong claim to use the 
words polar and aid. They are previously existing English words. He is 
tapping directly and obviously into those English meanings in a way that 
bears a logical and legitimate relationship to the products he offers for 
sale. He may not be attempting to free-ride at all. Any appearance of 
free-riding may be completely accidental. 
But let us assume the contrary. Let us assume that defendant is 
attempting to free-ride on the Polaroid mark, or at least that he is not 
unaware of the fact that he is capitalizing to some extent on the fame of 
that mark. I make this assumption because I think it is probably true. 
r89- See definition of "polar" available at http://www.hyperdictionary.com 
190. See definition of "oid" available at http://www.hyperdictionary.com 
I9I. See definition of "North Pole" available at http://www.hyperdictionary.com 
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Moreover, even if the defendant did not intend to free-ride here, it is 
likely that a considerable number of consumers would think of Polaroid 
when they encountered the Polaraid mark. 
Even so, the defendant's conduct probably would not be enjoined 
under the proposal I advance here. Where, as here, the defendant's dual 
use claim seems credible and related to the function of its products, the 
law should withhold an injunction. In this situation, the defendant's 
interests in tapping into common meanings of established words should 
outweigh the plaintiff's interests in preventing free-riding. To give 
plaintiff superior rights would unduly limit defendant's access to the 
words "polar" and "aid," when both words describe its products. It is not 
that defendant could not find another suitable trademark that in no way 
alluded to the Polaroid mark. Rather, my point here is that it is not fair 
to make the defendant do so. He should not have to steer clear of the 
words "polar" and "aid" when those words relate so clearly to the 
function of his products. 
One might say, alternatively, that the plaintiff assumed the risk of 
such free-riding when it chose to fashion its trademark from a common, 
existing word-polar. It was unreasonable for plaintiff to assume that it 
would be able to prevent everyone else from using that same word as a 
component part of their own marks. To give legal backing to this 
unreasonable assumption would be a violation of the Lockean Proviso-
which requires property owners to leave "enough and as good" for 
others. 192 Granting Polaroid injunctive relief in this case did not leave the 
owner of Polaraid with "enough and as good" language to use in 
fashioning its own mark. 193 
I provide these examples of how the free-rider concept might be 
applied in concrete cases not to persuade the reader of a particular 
result. Courts might come to different conclusions about how to answer 
these questions. My point here is only to suggest that the discussion 
about free-riding and its appropriate limits is more likely to yield positive 
fruit if we focus on the degree of inventiveness of the famous mark and 
the language sharing interest of the alleged free-rider than on the 
blurring and tamishment concepts of current dilution law. 
192. See discussion of Lockean Proviso, supra notes 159, 166. 
193. Another way to view the situation is that defendant should have a fair use defense analogous 
to copyright law. It has made a derivative work of a coined mark. Defendant added significant creative 
components of its own and developed its own coined mark that is independently worthy of protection. 
Defendant's use should not significantly cut into plaintiff's market in any way. On balance, this could 
be seen as a type of fair use. For an analogous attempt to craft limits on the anti-free-riding impulse in 
the right of publicity context, see Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of 
Publicity, 49 DUKE LJ. 383,421 (1999). 
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VI. TOWARD A NEW CAUSE OF ACTION: THE EUROPEAN "UNFAIR 
ADVANTAGE" CLAIM 
157 
In the preceding parts of this article, I have demonstrated that 
current dilution law purports to be about preventing dilutive harm, but 
really is about preventing free-riding on famous marks. I have also shown 
that the anti-free-riding impulse can be explained and justified as an 
integral part of an "as between" type of analysis. I have shown that this 
analysis is a more natural and compelling way to account for dilution 
cases than standard dilution theory. I have further shown that the anti-
free-riding impulse can be effectively limited by focusing on the degree 
of inventiveness of the famous mark and on the alleged free-rider's 
language sharing interests. 
Still, I am aware that many readers may be reluctant to embrace an 
independent cause of action that prevents free-riding without in some 
way tying the cause of action to a theory of harm. I hope that some of 
these fears can be allayed by the fact that we are not completely without 
guidance or precedent in this effort. We would not be the first country to 
adopt an anti-free-riding cause of action for famous trademarks that does 
not depend on a harm-based concept like dilution. Many European 
countries have a cause of action, explicitly denominated "unfair 
advantage," which enables judges to punish free-riding without resort to 
tortured reasoning about alleged dilutive harm '94 
The European "unfair advantage" cause of action is based on the 
European Directive on the Harmonization of Trademark Law (the 
"Directive").'95 It is often included as an alternative basis of liability in 
the same statutory provision that makes traditional dilution actionable. 
Specifically, article 4(4)(a) of the Directive allows European Union 
194. Council Directive 89fm4fEEC to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade 
marks, art. 4(4)(a), r989 OJ. (L 40) 1. Recently, for example, t!Ie Ftrst Board of Appeal of t!Ie 
European Union's Office For Harmonization In The Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) 
(OHIM) applied t!Ie unfair advantage cause of action to a dispute between an American 
microprocessor manufacturer (Intel Corporation) and a European company t!Iat was using a stylized 
variation of the INTEL mark in a different industry. See OHIM Decision of t!Ie First Board of Appeal, 
Intel Corp. v. Intei-Internazionale Elettrotecnica Associazione, Case R78212002-1, October 22, 2004 
(relating to Community Trademark application No. 854125, INTEL), available aJ 
http://www.oami.eu.int.The defendant was in the business of organizing trade shows for various 
companies, including electronic manufacturers. The lower tribunal had found no trademark 
infringement under any theory on the ground that the defendant's goods were too dissimilar from the 
plaintiff's to cause a likelihood of confusion or to constitute t!Ie taking of an "unfair advantage" on t!Ie 
reputation of plaintiff's INTEL mark. The Board of Appeal disagreed and reversed, finding tlrat t!Ie 
trade show company was taking unfair advantage of the INTEL mark. The court noted that t!Ie 
concept of unfair advantage is synonymous wit!I free-riding on t!Ie investment of anot!Ier firm in 
advertising its own mark and it found such free riding here. See id. at para. 6:3-68. The Board of 
Appeal also held that it was unnecessary to consider whether the defendant's use of the INTEL mark 
harmed t!Ie plaintiff in any way given t!Ie clear existence of unjustfied free riding. See id 
195. Council Directive 89fro4fEEC to approximate t!Ie laws of the Member States relating to trade 
marks, ar1.4(4)(a), 1989 0.1. (L40) I 
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Member States to refuse registration to trademarks that would take 
unfair advantage of the reputation of a mark that has already been 
registered or is to be registered within their territory: 
Any member State may 0 provide that a trade mark shall not be 
registered or, if registered, shall be liable to be declared invalid where, 
and to the extent that: [] the trade mark that is identical with, or similar 
to, an earlier national trade. mark . '· . an.d is .to be, or has been, 
registered for goods or services which are'not similar to those for which 
the earlier trade mark is registered, where the earlier trade mark has a 
reputation in the Member State concerned and where the use of the 
later trade mark without due cause would take unfair advantage of, or 
be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier 
trade mark. '96 
Similarly, article 5(2) of the Directive states that Member States may 
entitle trademark owners to enjoin the use of marks that would take 
unfair advantage of the repute of their marks: 
Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be 
entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in 
the course of trade any sign which is identical with, or similar to, the 
trade mark in relation to goods or services which are not similar to 
those for which the trade mark is registered, where the [trade mark] has 
a reputation in the Member State concerned and where use of that sign 
without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the 
distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark. l!n 
A number of European countries have enacted unfair advantage 
statutes which essentially track the EU Directives. Italian law is 
illustrative. !CJ8 For example, article I. I (c) of the Italian Trademark Ad99 
provides that: 
The owner [of a registered mark] has the right to prevent third parties, 
not having his authorization, from usin~ ... a sign identical with or 
similar to a mark registered for dissimilar goods or services, if the 
registered mark enjoys a reputation in the Country and if use of the sign 
without due cause permits taking unfair advantage of the distinctive 
character of the reputation of the mark or causing detriment to the 
same.
200 
The Italian Trademark law also provides that marks that take unfair 
advantage of earlier marks shall not be registered on the Italian 
1g6. /d. (emphasis added). 
HJ7. /d. at art. 5(2) (emphasis added). 
198. I discuss Italian law only as an example of ·how one European country has developed 
statutory and decisional law pursuant to the European Directive. It is not intended to be exhaustive or 
necessarily representative of how any other European country has implemented the same Directive. 
199. See Italian Trademark Act, Royal Decree No. 929 of June 21, 1942, amended by Legislative 
Decree No. 48o of Dec. 4, 1992 and by Legislative Decree No. 198 of Mar. 19 1<}96 (emphasis added) 
[hereinafter Italian Trademark Act]. 
200. Seeid. 
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trademark registry.20 ' 
The Italian Trademark Act thus provides expanded trademark 
protection under the following circumstances. First, only registered 
marks that "enjoy a reputation" in the Country (Italy) qualify for this 
type of protection. 202 The category of eligible marks appears to be 
broader than the category of famous marks that enjoy anti-dilution 
protection in the United States. It appears that any mark that is 
sufficiently well known to be subject to free-riding is sufficiently well 
known to be eligible for the expansive protections set forth in articles 
I.I{c) and n.r(g).WJ This is not to say that any and all trademarks qualify 
for this expanded form of protection. To the contrary, it appears that this 
protection is available only for marks that, due to their reputation, carry 
and communicate a symbolic message in a way that consumers will 
associate those marks with a junior similar mark used in connection with 
dissimilar products.201 
Second, there is conflicting law as to whether the unfair advantage 
cause of action applies only to dissimilar goods cases, or whether it might 
also be applied in cases where the plaintiff and the defendant are 
competitors (and thus sell similar types of goods).205 The better view 
seems to be that the unfair advantage cause of action should apply only 
to dissimilar goods. 
Third, the essence of the cause of action is the prevention of the 
taking of "unfair advantage" of the reputation of the well-known mark.206 
Uses of signs that take unfair advantage of a well-known mark are 
contrasted in the Italian statute with uses that are detrimental to the 
distinctive character of a well-known mark. 207 The latter concept is akin 
to the dilution cause of action in the United States. Taking unfair 
advantage of a mark is clearly a distinct type of wrong that is actionable 
under the Italian statute. The concept of unfair advantage is meant to 
201. See Italian Trademark Act art. 17.1(g). 
202. !d. arts. r.r(c), 17.r(g). 
203. See Case 375/97, General Motors v. Yplon, H.J99 E.C.R I-5421, 3 C.MLR 427, 'II 28 (1999), 
where the European Court of Justice, interpreting EU Directive 5(2) (upon which article 1.1[c] of the 
Italian Trademark Act is based), held that to qualify for the expanded protection under 5(2) a mark 
does not have to be prominent or even renown; instead, it must be known by a significant part of the 
public in the Member State concerned. This appears to be a broad standard favoring wide application 
of the unfair advantage cause of action. 
204 See id. 
205. Compare Davidoff & Cie SA v. Gofkid Ltd, [2003] All ER (EC) 1029, 'II 30, Case 292/00 
(2003) (unfair competition can protect against later user with similar or identical goods or services), 
with La Chemise Lacoste v. Crocodile Garments, Trib. di Milano, 12 July 1999, 1999 Giurisprudenza 
Annotata Di Dirito Industriale (Giur. Ann. Dir. Indus.], No. 4017, 1251 (holding Italy's version of 
unfair advantage directive does not apply when goods are in identical mercantile sector). 
2o6. See Nike Italy s.r.l. & Nike (Ireland) Ltd v. Saledo Italia s.r.J. & Carnpomar s.r.l. & Nike 
Cosmetics S.A, Trib. di Milano, 23 Dec. 1999, 2000 Giur. Ann. Dir. Indus., No. 4116, 578. 
207. Italian Trademark Act art. 17-1(g). 
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cover all instances where there is an attempt to take advantage-without 
due cause-on the reputation of the famous mark by exploiting and 
capitalizing on its attractive value and commercial magnetism.208 
Fourth, Italian courts in general appear to have limited the unfair 
advantage concept to cases where the defendant acted with demonstrable 
"parasitic intent. "209 In the reported cases, it would appear that only 
intentional and knowing free-riding has been enjoined under the unfair 
advantage prong of the Italian statute. 
Several courts have had occasion to apply the unfair advantage 
prong of the Italian statute. In all of these cases courts enjoined free-
riding on famous marks without requiring proof of dilution. For example, 
in one case, the Court of Milan held that the defendant's use of the sign 
(i.e.: trademark) Nike Sports Fragrance, as used in connection with 
perfumes and cosmetic products, took unfair advantage of the reputation 
of the famous mark Nike, on the ground that the adoption of such a 
similar sign was based on the clear intent of the defendant to benefit 
from the celebrity and attractive value of the mark belonging to the 
worldwide leader in sporting garments."0 The court did not require the 
plaintiff to prove a likelihood of confusion or dilution, but rather based 
its decision on the demonstrable free-riding intent of the defendant.211 
Similarly, in another case decided by the Court of Milan, it held that 
plaintiff's famous mark AGIP, as used in connection with gasoline in 
Italy, was infringed by the defendant's use of the mark Acid (with a logo 
that was similar to the AGIP logo ).212 The court was heavily influenced 
by the evidence of defendant's intent to capitalize on the reputation of 
the mark AGIP when they started marketing t-shirts under a similar 
mark.21J 
Finally, another Italian court held that the famous mark Pirelli, as 
used in connection with tires, was infringed when a company attempted 
to use the same mark on perfumes. 214 Again, the court was concerned not 
with confusion as to source or dilution as such, but rather with 
preventing an obvious attempt at unauthorized free-riding."5 The 
parasitic intent of the defendant provided an independent basis for 
enjoining its activity, despite the lack of proof of any type of commercial 
2o8. See Nike, 2000 Giur. Ann. Dir. Indus., No. 4116, at 585. 
209- See, e.g., id. 
210. See id. at 585. 
211. /d. 
212. AGIP Petroli s.p.a. v. Dig. It. Int'l s.r.l. & Ambrosiana Serigrafica s.r.l., Trib. di Milano, 4 
Mar. 1999, 1999 Giur. Ann. Dir. Indus., No. 3987, 977· 
213. /d. at g81. 
214. Pirelli s.p.a. v. SA.FO.SA s.r.l., Trib. di Monza, 8 July 1999, Giur. Ann. Dir. Indus., No. 4016, 
1226. 
215. /d. at 1255. 
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harm to the plaintiff. ''6 
These cases illustrate that it is possible to punish free-riding without 
resort to traditional principles of dilution. They also illustrate that it is 
possible to provide this extended form of trademark protection without 
wreaking undue havoc in the law. The Italian cause of action captures 
the essence of the anti-free-riding impulse and places it under the banner 
of "unfair advantage." But it also attempts to limit that impulse by 
including in the statute language that immunizes free-riding that is 
justified by "due cause."217 
It appears that Italian courts have not yet formulated a systematic 
doctrine for what will and what will not qualify as due cause for free-
riding on a famous trademark. However, at least one Italian decision 
may provide the seeds of a more developed theory. In the case of 
Leonardo Bugatti & Soci s.r.l. v. Ducati Motorcycles, the Italian court of 
Bologna refused the request of the famous Italian motorcycle maker, 
Ducati, to enjoin a beer maker from selling beer under a similar name.218 
The beer maker originally sold its beer under the label, Birra Ducati, 
which it later changed under pressure from the motorcycle company to 
Birra Ducati Italiani.219 The Court rejected the motorcycle company's 
contention that the use of the same mark in connection with selling beer 
took unfair advantage of, or was detrimental to, the reputation of 
defendant's mark."o The decision was formally premised on the ground 
that the products in question (motorcycles and beer) were so unrelated 
that any mental association in consumers' minds was unlikely.221 
However, the consumer association ·rationale seems suspect. The 
marks were nearly identical. Ducati had long been a famous mark for 
motorcycles in Italy. There can be little doubt consumers would think of 
motorcycles when seeing the beer. And it seems clear that defendant 
desired, to some extent, to take a free-ride on fame that had been created 
by the plaintiff. It seems more likely that the court's unwillingness to 
enjoin the defendant from continued use of the Ducati mark had to do 
with the fact that ducati is not a coined or even quasi-coined word in 
Italian. It means "dukes" and is generally understood as a reference to 
that period in Italian feudal history when various dukes ruled the land."' 
In these circumstances, the court's ruling would have been decided the 
216. !d. at 1246. 
217. See Italian Trademark Act art. r.1(c), stating that the accused use must be "without due 
cause"' to qualify for protection under the unfair advantage prong of the statute. 
218. Leonardo Bugatti & Soci s.r.l. v. Ducati Motorcycles s.p.a, Trib. di Bologna, 17 Feb. 1rnJ, 
Guir. Ann. Dir. Indus., No. 3746, 216. 
219- See id. at 22o-22. 
220. !d. 
221. !d. 
222 !d. 
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exact same way under the rules I propose here. . 
Because the Italian word "ducati" is not coined and not particularly 
distinctive (in Italian), it can be said that the motorcycle company, in 
selecting such a mark to make famous and invest with secondary 
meaning, assumed the risk that other businesses in unrelated fields would 
be entitled to take a free-ride on its investment. Given the overwhelming 
fame in Italy of Ducati motorcycles, it· is difficult to believe that the 
defendant was not attempting to free-ride on that fame. But the free-
riding was considered justifiable here because of the defendant's 
legitimate right to tap into the primary meaning of the Italian word for 
"dukes" as part of its own trademark. 
As the Ducati case illustrates, it ought to be possible to develop 
limits on an anti-free-riding cause of action that are based on 
considerations of language sharing and expressive freedom. The problem 
with the European model, however, is that it does not appear to be 
formally limited in any particular way. Rather, judges are given this 
vague statutory phrase-unfair advantage-and told only to limit it 
based on findings of due cause. One can find some attempts in the 
decided cases to impose such limits,223 but, again, these attempts have 
been far from systematic. 
Any adoption of the European model into American law would, 
therefore, require modification to include limitations, which would 
ensure appropriate protections for justifiable free-riding. Above I argued 
that such limitations might be grounded in theories about language 
sharing and expressive freedom.224 In order to safeguard these interests, a 
person should not be enjoined from using a mark that is the same or 
similar to a famous mark whenever the person (r) is not free-riding on 
that mark, but rather is tapping into the same underlying meanings that 
the famous mark happens to tap into; or (2) is partially free-riding on the 
mark, but this free-riding is justifiable given the person's interest in 
access to various parts of the English language. 
These language sharing concerns could be dealt with in a variety of 
ways: judges might wish to balance the respective property rights of the 
parties; they might wish to fashion bright line rules; or they may wish to 
adopt some mixture of these two approaches. Here, I argue that the 
latter approach is preferable. Expansive anti-free-riding protection 
should be categorically limited to coined and quasi-coined famous marks, 
and even with respect to such marks an injunction should be withheld 
whenever the defendant is tapping into meanings that exist in the English 
language separate and distinct from the fame of plaintiff's mark. 
By coined, I mean completely made-up words-i.e., words that 
223. See id. The Ducati case can be viewed as such an attempt 
224- See supra Part V. 
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simply did not exist before they were invented by the trademark owner. 
Kodak is an example; Xerox is another. Under the proposal I advance 
here, anti-free-riding protection might also extend to quasi-coined words, 
by which I mean words that are partially comprised of invented 
components. Polaroid is such a word. It did not exist before the camera 
company invented it, but it is not wholly made-up either. It includes the 
known word polar. Nevertheless, it is sufficiently distinct and creative to 
include it in the category of marks that are eligible for expansive 
trademark protection. 
I would also include in the quasi-coined category words that are 
creatively derived (partially made-up) from obscure words. Google is an 
example of this type of word. It was derived from the existing and 
obscure word googol (which signifies the number one with a hundred 
zeros). Although Google is pronounced the same as the known English 
word on which it is based (googol) and is only spelled slightly differently, 
it appears to be sufficiently obscure and unknown to the vast majority of 
Americans that it is the functional equivalent of a coined word. 
The point here is not to suggest that Google would always win in an 
anti-free-riding lawsuit. To the contrary, there may be cases where 
another party is justified in free-riding on Google's name. This could 
occur, for example, if a math book company named itself Googol-in an 
attempt to tap into the connection between the huge number (googol) 
and the purpose of studying math (number mastery). Rather, the point 
here is to show that there is no compelling reason why the famous mark 
Google should be ineligible per se for expansive anti-free-riding 
protection. 
Limiting anti-free-riding protection to coined and quasi-coined 
marks would be a quick and fairly easy way to ensure that the new cause 
of action does not interfere with other parties' legitimate reasons for 
free-riding. Indeed, one rarely has a good reason for free-riding on a 
mark that has been entirely made-up by someone else. Moreover, 
protection should not be automatic even for these types of marks. As I 
demonstrated above, judges should ask in every case whether an 
injunction would unduly limit the defendant's interests in language 
sharing and expressive freedom. 225 
VII. INTELLECTUAL HISTORY-REVISITING SCHECHTER 
In Part I of this article I mentioned that the dilution concept as 
exhibited in American trademark law has often been traced to a 1927law 
review article by Frank Schechter, a New York attomey.226 Schechter's 
original proposal applied only to coined, fanciful, or arbitrary marks; 
225. /d. 
226. See supra Part I, discussing Schechter, supra note 14. 
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only to situations in which the junior user's mark was identical to that of 
the senior user; and only to use of identical marks on non-competing 
goods.227 Schechter was not primarily concerned with preventing dilutive 
harm; rather, he was primarily concerned with protecting the property 
interests that arise in famous mark due to their unique function as 
creating and reinforcing commercial custom (i.e., cementing the link 
between consumer and mark owner).228 · 
To be sure, Schechter argued that marks can be harmed in ways that 
go beyond the traditional likelihood of confusion type of harm (i.e., the 
diversion of customers from mark owner to mark impersonator).229 And 
Schechter discussed the notion of the diminishment of a mark's selling 
power as a type of harm that falls outside the traditional likelihood of 
confusion paradigm.230 But Schechter's discussion of harm was, in my 
view, largely an add-on. It was a way to supplement an already strong 
property theory with something more. It was, in lawyer's language, an 
"even if' type of argument. Schechter was essentially saying that even if 
the pure property view is not enough to justify broad rights in 
trademarks, then those rights are further justified given the possibility 
that such marks might be harmed in a variety of ways if others are 
permitted to use them widely. 
The harm component was thus not essential to Schechter's theory. 
But Schechter did not do a good enough job in articulating why free-
riding on famous marks is wrong in one situation and acceptable in 
another. The harm prong of his theory thus served a purpose in the 
development of the dilution concept in American law: it furnished a 
potential (and alluring) boundary device for this expansive cause of 
action. That is, as the law developed in this area, legislators, courts, and 
commentators all attached to the dilution concept as a way of articulating 
and hopefully cabining the new cause of action. The result, eventually, is 
dilution law as we have come to know it. 
The problem with these developments is that harm has served as an 
illusory boundary. The concept of dilutive harm has not been easy to pin 
down. As I demonstrated above, we can never be very sure whether a 
mark is famous enough to qualify for dilution protection, but we are even 
less sure whether the mark has been harmed to a sufficient degree or in 
the specified way to warrant anti-dilution protection. The harm boundary 
has thus not fulfilled its promise. 23 ' It has not functioned as a useful 
limiting device. 
227. See Schechter, supra note 14. 
228. /d. at 818-19, 83o-33. 
229- See id. at 825. 
230. /d. at 814-19. 
231. See supra Part I. 
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More fundamentally, it is wrong to focus too much on harm in these 
cases. The most compelling rationale for offering an expanded form of 
property protection to famous trademarks lies in a multi-faceted 
balancing approach that focuses mostly on the comparative interests of 
the famous mark owner in protecting her investment (an interest that is 
limited by the type of mark she chose to make famous) and the relative 
interests of the would-be mark user in tapping into the underlying 
language that the famous mark employs. Considerations of harm, 
including dilutive harm, may figure in the analysis. But they are best seen 
as subsidiary to the issue of whether the mark owner has a sufficiently 
superior interest to be given control over a particular piece of language. 
It is also not particularly helpful to elevate harm-based concerns to a 
central place in trademark law. To do so is to miss the point of why anti-
free-riding protection ought to be available for a certain class of famous 
trademarks. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court's recent decision 
in the Victoria's Secret case, in which the Court heightened the harm 
requirement and mandated that plaintiffs show that actual dilutive harm 
has already begun to occur, is misguided.232 The malleability of the 
likelihood of dilution standard has enabled judges to punish free-riding 
in some situations where it should be punished. It is wrong to require 
actual harm when the essence of the cause of action is the prevention of 
free-riding. In short, the Court has exacerbated the wrong turn that was 
taken long ago in dilution law when it came to focus so fully on harm as a 
limiting device. 
The proposal advanced here seeks to return to the more property-
centered view offered by Frank Schechter in 1927. Harm would not play 
a primary role in the scheme put forward here. Rather, famous coined 
and quasi-coined marks would receive a broad form of property 
protection regardless of whether the use of the same mark by another 
entity would be likely to injure the mark owner-in the sense of causing 
a diminishment of the selling power of the mark or in the sense of 
tarnishing the image of the mark owner. 
However, the proposal advanced here is also significantly different 
than the one offered by Schechter. First, Schechter did not fully analyze 
why free-riding on coined marks is unacceptable but free-riding on other 
types of marks might be acceptable. Nor did he focus on the theoretical 
underpinnings of the anti-free-riding concept-its ultimate grounding in 
the "as between" type of argument and its reliance on harm only as a 
peripheral justification. Finally, he did not explore the countervailing 
interests in allowing people to use famous marks-particularly the 
interests in language sharing and expressive freedom. 233 
232. See Moseleyv. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418,425 (2003). 
233- See supra Part V. 
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Another area in which the proposal advanced here differs from the 
original Schechter proposal concerns whether anti-free-rider protection 
should be available to prevent the use of marks that are only similar to, 
but not identical to, the famous mark for which protection is sought. 
Schechter, without much explanation, limited his original proposal to 
identical marks. 234 That is, he would have offered expanded trademark 
protection only as a device for enjoining the use of a mark that was 
identical to the famous mark for which protection is sought.'35 I think 
Schechter was wrong in this respect. As I show above, there are 
compelling cases involving non-identical marks where anti-free-riding 
protection should be available. 236 And that protection should not 
necessarily entail more difficult proof requirements than situations 
involving identical marks.237 
CoNCLUSION 
I have argued in this Article that American dilution law focuses too 
much on harm and not enough on the anti-free-riding impulse and its 
limits. Harm is always possible when free-riding occurs, but it should not 
be the focus of an anti-free-riding law suit. This is so because ultimately 
the issue in such suits is whether the property interests of the plaintiff 
outweigh the language sharing and expressive freedom interests of the 
defendant. Focusing too much on harm distracts courts from this ultimate 
issue. In some cases, a focus on harm may function as a proxy for such 
concerns, but even if this is true, it is a clumsy and distracting doctrinal 
tool. By focusing on harm to the exclusion of these other interests courts 
are likely to offer too little protection in some cases and too much 
protection in others. 
The United States Supreme Court has made matters worse by ruling 
that dilution requires proof of actual harm.238 Actual harm rarely is 
present in these cases; nor should it be required to justify injunctive 
relief. The question of how imminent harm must be before relief can be 
granted is a wrong tum in this area of the law. The focus should instead 
be on the type of mark chosen by the plaintiff; specifically whether it is 
234- See Schechter, supra note 14, at 825. 
235. Tiris limitation has been echoed recently by the United States Supreme Court in its recent 
Victoria's Secret opinion. There the Court ruled that judges are no longer free to presume dilution 
from the mere fact that consumers mentally associate the defendant's mark with the plaintiff's famous 
mark. See Victoria's Secret, 537 U.S. at 433-34. But the Court limited this holding to cases such as the 
one before it-where the defendant's mark was not identical to the plaintiff's famous mark. /d. The 
Court did not limit dilution per se to identical marks situations, but it made dilution much harder to 
prove in situations where a defendant's mark is not identical to a plaintiff's mark. See McCARTHY, 
supra note 3, § 101:2. 
236. See supra Part V. 
237. See supra Part V(D). 
238. See supra Part I, discussing the recent Victoria's Secret case. 
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coined and distinctive, or whether it is merely an amalgamation of 
common words. The more distinctive the plaintiff's mark, the stronger 
the protection should be. Indeed, the proposal advanced here would 
provide expanded trademark protection only to coined or quasi-coined 
words. 
Equally important in these cases are defendants' interests in 
language sharing and expressive freedom. These interests receive the 
bulk of their protection by limiting expanded trademark rights to coined 
or quasi-coined marks. However, even coined marks should not receive 
unlimited protection. There are legitimate reasons for using marks that 
are similar to coined marks. Proper judicial sensitivity to these reasons is 
more likely to occur if they are openly debated. 
Dilution law, as originally conceived and proposed, was more akin to 
the proposal I make here than to dilution law as it is currently configured 
in the United States. In his seminal law review article on the subject, 
Frank Schechter urged a broad type of property right for certain types of 
trademarks. His examples all involved coined marks which were copied 
without justification. He argued that the expanded right was grounded in 
a property type rationale, not primarily in a tort rationale. Dilution law's 
departure from this paradigm has come at a high cost. American dilution 
law is incoherent and masks the underlying interests which are at stake in 
these cases. The proposal advanced here is an attempt to refocus dilution 
law on its proper aim-the protection of invented language against 
unjustified free-riding. 
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